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Consumer Contract Exchanges and the Problem of
Adhesion
Andrew A. Schwartzt
Businesses and sophisticated parties have long used "contract
exchanges, " like the Chicago Board of Trade, to obtain a fair price and protect
themselves from market volatility. These contract exchanges have greatly
benefited both their participants and the public at large, but participation was
long limited to a wealthy few. A decade ago, however, Internet websites,
including Hotwire and Priceline, brought the power of contract exchanges
directly to consumers, allowing regular people to flex their collective
bargaining power to obtain low prices on travel services. Even more recently,
other such "consumer contract exchanges, " including Prosper and
MoneyAisle, have organized vibrant markets for small loans and certificates of
deposit to the benefit of consumer borrowers and investors.
Modern contract law usually bends over backwards to protect consumers,
so one would surely expect it to be supportive of or at least not hostile to, these
developments. Surprisingly, however, one strand of common law doctrine-the
rules that pertain to so-called "contracts of adhesion "-actually stifles the
development of consumer contract exchanges by undermining the reliable
enforceability of the contracts they generate. Courts should therefore clarify
that while exchange-traded consumer contracts fit the formal definition of
contracts of adhesion, they should be enforced as if they were ordinary,
negotiated agreements.
This Article makes four novel contributions. First, it defines contract
exchanges and enumerates their necessary institutional attributes. Second, it
theorizes and recognizes a new form of contract exchange-the consumer
contract exchange. Third, it suggests that the doctrine of adhesion hinders the
further development of consumer contract exchanges. And fourth, it offers a
common law solution to this common law problem.
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School. For helpful critiques of
earlier drafts, I thank Richard Epstein, Victor Fleischer, Bob Hillman, Mark Loewenstein, Sarah
Krakoff, Helen Norton, Paul Ohm, Scott Peppet, Allison Schwartz, Jeremy Schwartz, Stephen Ware,
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Contracts, the Annual Faculty Meeting of the Federalist Society, the Annual Meeting of the Midwest
Law and Economics Association, the University of Colorado Law School Faculty Workshop, and its
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Introduction
For more than a century, business interests have used "contract
exchanges" like the Chicago Board of Trade ("CBOT") to obtain a fair price
and protect themselves from market volatility. A decade ago, websites like
Hotwire and Priceline brought this concept to consumers, thereby allowing
regular people to flex their collective bargaining power to get lower prices on
travel services. And in just the past few years, other consumer contract
exchanges have sprung up, such as Prosper, where consumers seeking small
loans can find other consumers that want to lend money. But one aspect of
modern contract doctrine-namely the special rules that pertain to "contracts of
adhesion"-prevents these innovative consumer contract exchanges from
reaching anything close to their full potential. This Article explores this
unintended consequence of the adhesion doctrine and proposes a resolution.
314
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This Article defines contract exchange as an organized market where
contracts are created and traded among strangers. Two institutional attributes
serve as prerequisites to all functioning contract exchanges: first, nonnegotiable
standard form contracts must be used, such that every contract is fungible with
every other; second, those contracts must be reliably enforceable at law.
Contract exchanges confer substantial benefits on participants, including
enhanced liquidity and reduced transaction costs. Contract exchanges also
benefit the public at large through price discovery-the public revelation of
transaction price information.
To have an organized market in, say, West Texas sour crude oil, every
barrel must be substantially identical to every other, because the market would
not function if the type or quality of the oil varied. The same is true for a
contract exchange. Thus, the first prerequisite of a functioning contract
exchange is that the contracts created or traded must be fungible. In other
words, they must be standardized and nonnegotiable, and they must concern a
generic subject matter. And while trust or informal means of enforcement
might suffice when dealing with known counterparties, trading on an exchange
is anonymous. Thus, the second prerequisite is that the contracts must be
reliably enforceable at law.
Traditional contract exchanges, such as a commodities futures exchange,
are exclusive private organizations. CBOT, for instance, has only a few
thousand "seats," each of which sells for millions of dollars to those who can
afford one. The result is that a wealthy few reap the benefits of participating in
a contract exchange-but ordinary consumers do not. This may have been
inevitable when the number of traders was limited by the size of an exchange
hall. But the arrival of the digital era has rendered physical constraints
irrelevant. The Internet makes it possible to organize a contract exchange with
an unlimited number of seats-and that is precisely what has happened. A new
form of contract exchange has recently emerged, one in which consumers are
expressly invited to participate. This Article calls these "consumer contract
exchanges" and they display both of the necessary institutional attributes of all
functioning contract exchanges.
Several examples will be considered below, including Hotwire and
Priceline, websites where consumers can contract for generic travel services,
and Prosper, a "peer-to-peer" debt market where consumers can make
unsecured loans to one another. Just as CBOT was a boon for farmers and
others, these new consumer contract exchanges serve consumers well.
Empirical data show that consumers receive better prices and interest rates-
and suffer less racial, gender, or other discrimination-when they participate in
consumer contract exchanges. In short, consumer contract exchanges are good
for consumers and in the public interest.
315
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But that old "brooding omnipresence in the sky"'-the common law-
casts a dark shadow that has stunted the development of consumer contract
exchanges. As a matter of contract doctrine, a nonnegotiable standard form
consumer contract is viewed as a "contract of adhesion," and its terms are
subject to a substantive judicial review for fairness. This substantive review has
the effect of undermining the reliable enforceability of contracts of adhesion.
But as just explained, for a contract exchange to function, the contracts must be
reliably enforceable.
This paradox has been long understood in the context of traditional
contract exchanges like CBOT. In those cases, courts have appreciated that
contracts of adhesion are necessary to the functioning of the exchange and,
accordingly, have held that even though the contracts traded meet the definition
2
of contracts of adhesion, they should not be subject to the fairness review. In
contrast, no court has addressed the issue in the context of a consumer contract
exchange. And judicial concerns over contracts of adhesion are heightened
when the "adherent" is a consumer. It is, therefore, unclear at present whether
courts can be counted on to reliably enforce the contracts of adhesion
originated or traded on consumer contract exchanges. Hotwire and Priceline
have worked around the problem by requiring full payment upfront, but this
solution can only work for small value transactions. For contracts of any
significant size, there is no substitute for reliable enforceability.
This uncertain legal enforceability reveals a crack in the legal
infrastructure of consumer contract exchanges-one that needs immediate
repair. This Article argues that contracts created or traded on consumer contract
exchanges should be treated by courts as if they were ordinary, negotiated
agreements. Standardization of terms should not be viewed with suspicion but
rather as an indication of a well-functioning marketplace. In short, even though
exchange-traded or -created consumer contracts meet the formal definition of a
contract of adhesion, they should be treated as if they do not.
This Article makes four primary contributions to the literature. First, it
defines contract exchanges and enumerates their necessary and useful
institutional attributes. Second, it theorizes a new form of contract exchange
called a consumer contract exchange and offers several contemporary
examples. Third, it shows that the common law contract doctrine of adhesion
hinders the development of consumer contract exchanges. And fourth, it
suggests a common law solution to this problem.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I defines the term "contract
exchange," describes the many benefits and few costs of such exchanges, and
describes several contract exchanges oriented toward consumers. Part II
explains the concept of a contract of adhesion and describes current common
I. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
2. E.g., Rudbart v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 605 A.2d 681, 682-83 (N.J. 1992).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 211-216.
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law doctrine on adhesive contracts. Part III builds on the previous Parts to
argue that the uncertain legal enforceability of contracts of adhesion hinders the
growth and development of consumer contract exchanges. To solve this
problem, this Article proposes that the law should treat contracts created or
traded on consumer contract exchanges the same as ordinary, nonadhesive
contracts.
I. Contract Exchanges
A. Definition
This Article defines a "contract exchange" as a centralized and organized
marketplace for the origination or trading of specific contracts. A contract
exchange is similar to any other marketplace, from a stock exchange to a flea
market, in that it brings buyers and sellers together in a single location. It
differs in that contracts for goods or services-not goods or services
themselves-are traded. A familiar example is a futures exchange, like CBOT,
where contracts for the future delivery (that is, futures contracts) of corn,4
wheat, and other crops have been traded since the nineteenth century. By way
of contrast, municipal and corporate bonds (that is, lending contracts) are
bought and sold in private one-off transactions, usually over the telephone,
rather than traded on contract exchanges. 5
The concept of a contract exchange may seem a bit abstract-and indeed
it is. One cannot walk into a futures exchange and buy wheat; one can only buy
a contract that entitles one to receive wheat for a given price at a given time in
the future.6 Immediate trades, such as goods for money, are not transacted on a
contract exchange but rather on the so-called "spot" or "cash" market.7 Thus, a
4. See JONATHAN LURIE, THE CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE 1859-1905, at 22-23 (1979);
George F. Stone, Board of Trade of the City of Chicago, 38 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sa. 189,
191 (1911). Futures exchanges, featuring lively "trading pits" of gesticulating traders, have become an
enduring part of American popular culture. See, e.g., FERRIS BUELLER'S DAY OFF (Paramount Pictures
1986) (depicting suburban Chicago high school students who skip school to have a perfect day in
Chicago by, among other things, paying a visit to CBOT); TRADING PLACES (Paramount Pictures 1983)
(showing comedic plot that centers around frozen concentrated orange juice futures contracts).
5. See ROBERT W. KOLB & JAMES A. OVERDAHL, UNDERSTANDING FuTuRES MARKETS 6
(6th ed. 2006); Yakov Amihud et al.. A New Governance Structure for Corporate Bonds, 51 STAN. L.
REv. 447, 459 n.45 (1999) (noting that "most corporate bonds trade over-the-counter and in negotiated
transactions between investors and dealers"); Hendrik Bessembinder et al., Market Transparency,
Liquidity Externalities, and Institutional Trading Costs in Corporate Bonds, 82 J. FIN. ECON. 251, 252
(2006); Jeffery Schaff & Michele Schaff, Municipal Bond Market Improprieties and the Potential
Brutality ofInvesting in Bonds, 11 PUB. INVESTORS ARB. B. ASS'N B.J. 56, 64 (2004) ("Investors cannot
see their municipal bonds quoted in their newspaper, nor are they available on Yahoo!").
6. E.g., Bd. of Trade of the City of Chi. v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 245
(1905) (noting that on a futures exchange, parties "make sales and purchases exclusively for future
delivery") (emphasis added).
7. Roberta Romano, A Thumbnail Sketch of Derivative Securities and Their Regulation, 55
MD. L. REv. 1, 7 (1996) (noting that in the "spot" or "cash" market, "goods or services purchased or
sold are immediately transferred and paid for"). Note that these cash transactions are not contracts,
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market in wheat contracts is "derivative" of wheat itself, and exchange-traded
contracts are often called "derivatives." 8
Contract exchanges have rules, of one form or another, that both define
the terms of the contracts traded and govern trading.9 These rules are designed
to guarantee uniformity of the contracts, as well as the underlying subject
matter of the contract. Thus, from a buyer's perspective, any contract for wheat
on the exchange contains identical contractual terms and concerns identical
quantities and qualities of wheat.10 This uniformity is essential to the
functioning of the contract exchange. Off the exchange, of course, private
parties are free to make whatever deals they desire. But on the exchange, only
certain specific contracts may be consummated. That is to say, exchange
participants are only allowed to enter into one of a handful of form contracts
whose every term-save the price-is specified by exchange rules and may not
be altered.
A contract exchange may offer either a "primary market" or a "secondary
market"-or both. In a primary market, two exchange participants mutually
assent to one of the authorized form contracts at a price agreeable to both. Once
a contract is created in a primary market, one party may wish to sell their rights
under the contract to a third party. Such a sale is called a "secondary sale," and
the market for such trades is called a secondary market. Secondary markets are
made possible by a common law rule that allows contract holders to freely
assign their contractual rights in the absence of an agreement to the contrary."
Contract exchanges are socially beneficial organizations that serve the
public interest as well as the interests of private participants. As discussed more
because a contract by definition contemplates future performance, and a cash transaction is just a
"present sale." I E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 1.1, at 4-5 (3d ed. 2004)
("[T]he present (or 'cash') sale" is not a contract because "the law of contracts" is only concerned with
"commitment[s] as to future behavior.").
8. Romano, supra note 7, at 2 (explaining that derivatives are "financial instruments whose
value derives from some other, more fundamental, asset"); see KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 5, at 56.
9. See, e.g., CHI. MERCANTILE EXCH. GRP., CBOT RULEBOOK,
http://www.cmegroup.com/rulebook/CBOT/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2011) [hereinafter CBOT
RULEBOOK]; CHI. MERCANTILE EXCH. GRP., CME RULEBOOK,
http://www.cmegroup.com/rulebook/CME/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2011) [hereinafter CME RULEBOOK].
10. See CBOT RULEBOOK, supra note 9, § 14101 ("Each futures contract shall be for 5,000
bushels of No. 2 Soft Red Winter, No. 2 Hard Red Winter, No. 2 Dark Northern Spring, and No. 2
Northern Spring at par; and No. I Soft Red Winter, No. I Hard Red Winter, No. I Dark Northern Spring
and No. I Northern Spring at 3 cents per bushel over contract price. Every delivery of wheat may be
made up of the authorized grades for shipment from eligible regular facilities provided that no lot
delivered shall contain less than 5,000 bushels of any one grade in any one facility."); id. § 14104
(defining and describing wheat grades).
I1. 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, § 11.2, at 66; see Shannon D. Kung, The Reverse
Triangular Merger Loophole and Enforcing Anti-Assignment Clauses, 103 Nw. U. L. REv. 1037, 1043
nn.31 & 33 (2009) (collecting authorities). Note that "assignment" refers to the transfer of a contractual
right, which is generally allowed, and which extinguishes the original obligee's right. "Delegation," or
the transfer of a contractual duty, is also generally allowed, but it does not extinguish the original
obligor's duty (although the delegee's performance will have that effect). 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 7,
§ 11.10, at 125, 127.
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fully later in this Section, contract exchanges facilitate efficient anonymous
transactions among strangers by reducing transaction costs and counterparty
risk. In addition to these private benefits, contract exchanges also provide
important public benefits, most notably through the process of price
discovery.12
Two institutional attributes serve as prerequisites to the existence of a
working contract exchange. First, because the primary purpose of a contract
exchange is to create a liquid market in fungible assets, nonnegotiable, standard
form contracts are required. Second, because in a contract market one contracts
with anonymous strangers, the contracts must be reliably enforceable at law. In
addition to these prerequisites, there are several other institutional attributes of
contract exchanges that are not strictly necessary but are nonetheless important
to the smooth functioning of such exchanges. These include a clearinghouse,
margin requirements, membership standards, and public price disclosure, all of
which are regularly found in current contract exchanges.
The remainder of this Part describes the nature and importance of all of
these institutional characteristics, using the traditional commodity futures
exchange as an exemplar.!3 This Part then concludes with a normative
discussion of the social benefits and costs of contract exchanges.
1. Necessary Institutional Attributes
The two institutional attributes that serve as prerequisites to the existence
of a functioning contract exchange are standardized contracts and reliable
enforceability.
a. Standardized Contracts
In "our legal lore," a contract is formed by the mutual agreement of the
parties who have almost total discretion to structure and draft their agreement
as they see fit.14 Such freedom is basic to contract law in the United States.
Contract customization, of course, has many positive features. For example,
individualized contracts can be tailored to the mutual desires of the parties. Yet,
the terms of contracts created or traded on exchanges are not decided by the
parties to the specific contract, but are dictated by a third party-usually the
exchange itself-leaving only the price as a matter of debate.' 5 All of the
12. See infra Section I.B.
13. This discussion owes a great deal to the discussions of futures exchange characteristics in
Romano, supra note 7, at 10-16; and Mark D. West, Private Ordering at the World's First Futures
Exchange, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2574, 2584-87 (2000).
14. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts ofAdhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43
COLUM. L. REv. 629,630-31 (1943).
15. See Hershey v. Energy Transfer Partners, L.P., 610 F.3d 239, 242 (5th Cir. 2010) ("The
public markets for futures standardize the contracts. Everything, except for price, remains the same from
319
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material terms of an exchange-traded contract are standardized, as is the
underlying subject matter. Even if both parties wished to alter some clause,
and agreed on precisely the change to be made, they would be powerless to
customize their agreement. This is because a contract with malleable terms
could not realistically be created or traded on an exchange. A standardized
contract is needed for both a primary and a secondary market.7
As to a primary market contract exchange, standardized terms are
essential because the use of a uniform contract allows exchange participants to
directly compete on price. For example, if Trader A offered a contract with
clause x for $10 and Trader B offered a similar contract containing clause y for
$12, it would not be immediately clear which was the more attractive offer. But
if the exchange standardizes the contract so that both contracts contain clause x
but not clause y, then it will be apparent at a glance which is the better deal.
That is to say, the standardization of terms reduces information costs for
participants in a primary market on a contract exchange.' 8 After reviewing a
single exemplar of the contract, they can focus exclusively on the price. 19
The underlying subject matter of the contracts traded must also be
standardized in order to easily compare the offers from various traders. For
instance, all wheat traders agree that every bushel of wheat that is graded No. 2
Soft Red Winter wheat is identical to every other bushel so graded.20 In fact,
this is emphatically not so. Despite the efforts to which exchanges go to ensure
uniformity,21 there will always be many small differences in the actual bushels,
even within a grade.22 Nevertheless, these differences are immaterial-or at
least the traders implicitly agree to treat them as such.23
one futures contract to the next."); Lester G. Telser & Harlow N. Higinbotham, Organized Futures
Markets: Costs and Benefits, 85 J. POL. ECON. 969, 972 (1977).
16. The subject matter of the contract must be identical because it would be impossible to have
fungible contracts that relate to subject matters that differ.
17. See Douglas G. Baird, The Boilerplate Puzzle, 104 MICH. L. REv. 933, 947 (2006)
(explaining that commodities trading "is possible only when contracts are standardized"); Romano,
supra note 7, at 10, 12-13; Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private
Ordering in the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701, 724 n.95 (1999) ("[E]xchange-traded
futures and option contracts must include standardized terms."); Telser & Higinbotham, supra note 15,
at 971, 997 ("[A] necessary feature of an organized market is a standard contract traded on that
market."); Alan S. Blinder, The Two Issues To Watch on Financial Reform, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 2010,
at A23 ("[B]efore derivative contracts can be traded on exchanges, they must be standardized.").
18. Henry T. Greely, Contracts as Commodities: The Influence of Secondary Purchasers on
the Form of Contracts, 42 VAND. L. REv. 133, 138 (1989).
19. See KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 5, at 8 ("This uniformity helps to promote liquidity.").
20. See CBOT RULEBOOK, supra note 9, § 14101.
21. See, e.g., id. § 14104 (distinguishing grades of wheat based on whether they average two,
three or four parts per million of a certain impurity).
22. E.g., Leslie Josephs, Aging Coffee Stocks Push Exchange To Act, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16,
2010, at C7 ("Responding to a growing buzz that its stockpiles of arabica coffee include beans far past
their prime, IntercontinentalExchange Inc. last week said it will ... prohibit beans too old to make good
coffee from being delivered against the contract.").
23. But see Leslie Josephs, ICE Adds Brazilian Coffee Beans to Its Mix, WALL ST. J. ONLINE
(Dec. 9, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704720804576010111804632734.html
(reporting that when the world's leading coffee futures contract added Brazilian-grown arabica beans to
320
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Standardization is also essential for a secondary market. Just as
agricultural goods or other commodities must be fungible to be traded-every
barrel of West Texas sour crude oil is equivalent to every other-so too must a
contract to buy or sell the oil be fungible to be traded on a secondary market.
By standardizing the contracts traded, an exchange "deliberately creates a
homogenous good that can be traded anonymously by the participants." 24 In
other words, a liquid market in a commodified asset-whether an ounce of gold
or a standardized contract for the sale of an ounce of gold-is only possible
when each unit of that asset is equivalent to every other.25 Thus, every clause in
an exchange-traded contract (save the price) must be specified and set in stone,
with no exceptions allowed for anyone.26 This standardization of exchange-
traded contracts makes them "more akin to frozen pork bellies than to what
lawyers consider contracts."27 They are "contracts as commodities."2
The exclusive use of standard form contracts on the exchange yields a
major benefit to all participants: it facilitates a vibrant, liquid market for the
contract-and liquidity is valuable in and of itself.29 That is to say, all else
being equal, people and firms prefer a liquid asset to an illiquid one. This basic
financial concept is familiar to anyone who has observed that interest rates
offered on savings or checking accounts that can be withdrawn on demand are
consistently lower than those offered for certificates of deposit ("CDs") that
cannot be withdrawn for a set period of time. 30 Hence, contract exchanges
create value by facilitating a liquid market for standardized contracts.
In addition, when trading standardized contracts, a party can "easily and
cheaply offset and close a position"31 by "engaging in an opposing transaction"
the types that may be delivered against the contract (at a nine cent discount), critics complained that
because Brazilian beans are widely viewed as inferior-"[t]he commodity on this contract won't be
homogenous.").
24. Telser & Higinbotham, supra note 15, at 997; see Romano, supra note 7, at 10 (noting that
"homogenous units" of the contract "eliminate[] disputes over value and guarantee[] abundant supply so
that market competition sets prices").
25. KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 5, at 8.
26. Id. at 6; see also 1 SHERMAN, OHIO RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE, § 3.06, at 3-7 (2008) ("If
the form note and mortgage are altered in any way, the secondary market will not purchase the loan. For
that reason, there is no room for negotiation.").
27. Greely, supra note 18, at 135.
28. Id.
29. Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, Liquidity and Asset Prices: Financial Management
Implications, 17 FIN. MGMT. 5, 6 (1988) ("[T]he greater the liquidity of an asset, the greater its value."
(citing Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, Asset Pricing and the Bid-Ask Spread, 17 J. FIN. ECON. 223
(1986))); Laura Nyantung Beny, Insider Trading and Stock Markets Around the World: An Empirical
Contribution to the Theoretical Law and Economics Debate, 32 J. CORP. L. 237, 251 & n.82 (2007)
(collecting empirical and theoretical support); Robert L. Knauss, Corporate Governance-A Moving
Target, 79 MIcH. L. REV. 478, 481 (1981) (noting that liquidity is of "overriding" importance to
investors).
30. On a larger scale, several major financial institutions, including Bear Stearns and Lehman
Brothers, went out of business virtually overnight during the recent financial crisis due, in large part, to a
sudden lack of liquidity for the assets they held.
31. KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 5, at 4.
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on the exchange.3 2 For instance, a party that sold a contract to deliver 5000
bushels of corn in September for $500 can "cancel out" that trade by buying
(sometime before September) a contract to receive 5000 bushels of corn in
September for $500.33 Were the contract an idiosyncratic negotiated contract,
one would "have to take or make physical delivery of the underlying asset" or
try to "find someone willing to assume their side of the contract"-a costly,
time-consuming and uncertain enterprise. 34
Next, this Article addresses contract standardization in the context of a
traditional futures exchange like CBOT. But before addressing futures, it
explains their evolutionary ancestor, the forward contract.35 A forward contract
is an agreement between two parties for the purchase and sale of a commodity,
with delivery and payment to take place at a specific time and place in the
future.36 It is a very useful type of contract that has been used in commercial
37
markets for thousands of years.
A simple example is a forward contract made in April by a farmer and a
restaurant owner. The farmer plans to plant corn in May and harvest it in
August. The restaurateur plans to serve corn for a special menu in September.
The two parties can enter into a forward contract whereby the farmer promises
to deliver 275 ears of red corn and 225 ears of yellow corn to the restaurant on
the first of September, and the restaurateur promises to pay $100 upon delivery.
The farmer and restaurateur could simply wait until September 1 and seek out a
transaction on the cash or "spot" market at that point,38 but the forward contract
allows the farmer to lock in a buyer and a price for the crop before planting it,
and ensures the restaurateur will have corn to serve in September. This process
of protecting oneself from future swings in the spot market price is called
"hedging." 39
What if the restaurant changes its menu and the restaurateur no longer has
any need for the corn? It would be best if the restaurateur could find someone
else who needs corn and would be willing to accept the rights and obligations
of the forward contract. But because the restaurateur's contract with the farmer
32. Id. at 17 ("By far, most futures contracts are completed through offset or via a reversing
trade."); Romano, supra note 7, at 12.
33. Theoretically, the exchange could force the trader to deliver 5000 bushels of corn and
receive $100, then immediately pay the $100 and take 5000 bushels of corn, leaving him exactly where
he started. But to avoid this waste of effort, the exchange just "zeroes out" the trader's account.
34. Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARv. L. REV.
1173, 1178 n.13 (1983) (arguing that without standardized contracts, "the making of offsetting
transactions, covering, and the entire apparatus of speculation on an exchange would be impossible or
much more difficult"); Romano, supra note 7, at 12-13.
35. KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 5, at 3 (noting that "futures contracts evolved from
forward contracts"); Joseph M. Burns, Trading in Futures Markets, 38 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 33, 34 (1982)
("A futures exchange may be viewed as the application of economies of scale to forward contracts.").
36. KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 5, at 1; Romano, supra note 7, at 7.
37. KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 5, at 2.
38. See Romano, supra note 7, at 7.
39. KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 5, at 26-27.
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was a negotiated agreement, it contains idiosyncrasies-odd quantities,
multiple varieties of corn, and delivery to the restaurant-that make it much
less valuable to a third party. It is therefore difficult, if not impossible, for the
restaurateur to sell the interest in the forward contract.40 Had the contract called
for, say, 500 ears of white corn delivered to the central train station, it would be
much easier to find a buyer for the rights under the contract. This issue is
endemic to forward contracts: because they are individually customized to the
wishes of the original parties, they are as a class worth less to third parties than
they would be if they were formulaic.4 1
It took several thousand years, but the liquidity problem was finally
solved through the creation of futures contracts.42 In contrast with individually
negotiated forward contracts, futures contracts call for a carefully described and
graded underlying commodity to be delivered at a specific place and time, and
in a certain manner. This standardization of the underlying subject matter paves
the way for standardization of the contracts themselves.43
Unlike forwards, which are one-on-one private transactions, futures are
created and traded on an organized contract exchange." It is the futures
exchange itself-not either of the parties-that drafts the terms of the
4 46
contract.4 5 These terms, generally found in the rules of the exchange, are
nonnegotiable and highly specific. For example, the butter futures contract
traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange ("CME") is for 40,000 pounds of
USDA Grade AA frozen butter, delivered to an approved warehouse "on any
business day of the contract month except that delivery may not be made prior
to the third business day following the first Friday of the contract month." 47
Every butter contract on the CME has identical terms, and no trader is
permitted to alter them in any way. And, as explained above, this
standardization has the important effect of making futures contracts into
fungible commodities that can easily be priced and traded on a liquid market.48
40. See Romano, supra note 7, at 12-13.
41. Id.; see Greely, supra note 18, at 139.
42. KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 5, at 8; Romano, supra note 7, at 10. The first forward
contracts may have been made as early as 1894 B.C., KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 5 at 2-3, but the
first futures contracts were not entered into until the seventeenth century, West, supra note 13, at 2574.
43. See, e.g., NRT Metals, Inc. v. Manhattan Metals (Non-Ferrous) Ltd., 576 F. Supp. 1046,
1051 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); 1 PHILIP MCBRIDE JOHNSON & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, DERIVATIVES
REGULATION § 1.02[3], at 25 (2004) ("A key feature of these futures contracts is their standardized,
uniform terms.. .. The terms of a futures contract are not negotiable between the parties; they must be
accepted by both."); KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 5, at 6 (noting that a "major difference between
forward and futures contracts is that futures contracts always have standardized contract terms").
44. KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 5, at 3. Compare Romano, supra note 7, at 7-10
(describing idiosyncratic forward contracts that are not traded on exchanges), with id. at 10-16
(describing standardized futures contracts that are traded on exchanges).
45. KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 5, at 6.
46. E.g., CBOT RULEBOOK, supra note 9.
47. CME RULEBOOK, supra note 9, §§ 5100, 5103.B, 5104.C.
48. See Breyer v. First Nat'l Monetary Corp., 548 F. Supp. 955, 963 (D.N.J. 1982); KOLB &
OVERDAHL, supra note 5, at 6-8 ("[The] difference between forward and futures contracts is that futures
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b. Reliable Enforceability
The second necessary attribute of a contract exchange is that the traded
contract must be reliably enforceable at law.49 By "reliable" enforceability, this
Article means the general level of enforcement that American law gives to
ordinary contracts. No contract is bulletproof. There is always a chance that the
party resisting enforcement will claim duress or declare bankruptcy or set up
some other defense to enforcement, but contracts are, as a rule, reliably
enforceable in the United States.50 A legal opinion letter, for instance,
commonly includes a statement that a given contract "is a valid and binding
enforceable obligation," even though the drafter well knows that a court might
refuse enforcement on, say, statute of limitations grounds.5' This is the level of
enforcement necessary for a modem contract exchange. 52
As a general matter, legal enforceability is what gives a contract value. A
contract that is not enforceable is not really a contract-it is just a promise. A
bare promise may have some value in certain situations, thanks to private and
informal methods of enforcement. Lisa Bernstein, Robert Ellickson, and others
have documented examples of groups that opt out of legal enforcement,
including diamond dealers and cattle ranchers.54 However, such "relational
contracting" is a realistic alternative to legal enforceability only when the
contracts always have standardized terms. . . . [F]utures contracts are highly uniform with well-specified
commitments for a carefully described good to be delivered at a certain time and in a certain manner.
Generally, the futures contract specifies the quantity and quality of the good that can be delivered to
fulfill the futures contract. The contract also specifies the delivery date . . . . This uniformity helps to
promote liquidity."); Romano, supra note 7, at 12-13.
49. Rudbart v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 605 A.2d 681, 682-83 (N.J. 1992)
("The transfer of securities in the primary and secondary market hinges upon the certainty of the terms
of such securities, and the assurance that those terms cannot be overridden by judicial fiat."); Gerald D.
Gay & Joanne T. Medero, The Economics of Derivatives Documentation: Private Contracting as a
Substitute for Government Regulation, 3 J. DERIVATIvEs 78, 86 (1996) (nothing that the effectiveness of
a contract exchange "depends critically upon the legal certainty of enforceability"); Telser &
Higinbotham, supra note 15, at 971 (stating that a "necessary feature" of a contract exchange is that
"some legal entity is liable for fulfilling the terms of the contract").
50. See HERITAGE FOUNDATION, United States, in 2011 INDEX OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM
(2011) (stating that "contracts are secure" in the United States); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 1 (1981) ("A contract is a promise ... for the breach of which the law gives a remedy
51. TRI-BAR OPINION COMM., THIRD-PARTY "CLOSING" OPINIONS: A REPORT OF THE TRI-
BAR OPINION COMMITTEE § 3.1-.6 (1998), in A. SIDNEY HOLDERNESS & BROOKE WUNNICKE, LEGAL
OPINION LETTERS FORMBOOK app. C (2d ed. 2003).
52. Mark West has shown that at the "world's first organized futures market," the lack of legal
enforceability of the contracts traded was not a hindrance. See West, supra note 13, at 2576, 2605. But
that exchange was established in Japan under a shogunate system of government that refused to enforce
most private contracts, leaving them to private resolution instead. Id. at 2605-06. So the exchange-traded
contracts were treated the same as other types of contracts, which is really all that is required.
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981) (defining "contract" as "a promise ...
for the breach of which the law gives a remedy").
54. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in
the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL. STUD. 115, 115 (1992); Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of
Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597, 613 (1990).
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parties know each other personally and deal with each other repeatedly over
time." Outside of these unique circumstances, legal enforceability, at least as a
background rule, is essential to convince people to make contracts with
unknown parties at arm's length.56
This reality is particularly true of contract exchanges because the essential
goal of any such exchange is to facilitate anonymous trades among strangers.
It is hypothetically possible for a contract exchange to serve only a limited
number of participants who know each other, but the nature of an exchange is
that its success is directly dependent on the number of participants: the more,
the better.58 Thus, in the usual case-where there are a large number of
exchange participants that are strangers to one another-reliable legal
enforceability is necessary for the exchange to function.
Futures contracts traded on traditional exchanges are, as they must be,
reliably enforceable at law.59 Judicial enforcement of futures contracts rarely
arises in practice, of course, because the vast majority of futures contracts are
closed out through "offset" or by a "reversing trade." 60 But it is fundamental
that a party has the power to hold a future until the delivery month, at which
point "the futures contract becomes a presently enforceable contractual
obligation" to deliver or pay for the named commodity.61
The principle that exchange-traded contracts must be reliably enforceable
at law was demonstrated in recent years when organized exchanges for energy
futures and other novel derivatives grew to significant size.62 Under an ancient
common law rule, "difference" contracts-those where the parties do not really
55. F. Scott Kieff, Coordination, Property, and Intellectual Property: An Unconventional
Approach to Anticompetitive Effects and Downstream Access, 56 EMORY L.J. 327, 356 (2006) (arguing
that informal "relational contracting" is effective "within homogeneous communities").
56. Ethiopis Tafara & Robert J. Peterson, In Praise of Middlemen: The Regulation of Market
Intermediaries in Developing Economies, 37 GEO. J. INT'LL. 153, 158 (2005) ("[Oinly the government
can effectively and efficiently . .. enforce contracts."); see David Streitfeld, Debts Rise, and Go Unpaid,
as Bust Erodes Home Equity, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2010, at A3 (noting that many mortgagors who owe
more than their houses are worth refuse to pay absent court orders).
57. Telser & Higinbotham, supra note 15, at 997-98 (explaining that a contract exchange
"deals in a highly fungible good that is readily traded among strangers").
58. Id. at 997 ("The benefit of an organized market is an increasing function of the number of
potential participants.").
59. Hershey v. Energy Transfer Partners, L.P., 610 F.3d 239, 242 (5th Cir. 2010) ("If a short
party holds the future until it comes due, ... then the futures contract becomes a presently enforceable
contractual obligation to deliver the natural gas."); see Tafara & Peterson, supra note 56, at 158
("[Futures markets succeeded in nineteenth-century America because] market participants-
intermediaries, producers and consumers-understood that the agreements they entered into would be
honored. They knew they would have [legal] recourse if a contract were broken").
60. KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 5, at 17.
61. Hershey, 610 F.3d at 242; Romano, supra note 7, at 13 ("[E]ven though cash settlement
(by contract reversal) is the most typical method of settlement in futures markets, the physical delivery
option is critical.").
62. See MARK JICKLING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: REGULATION
OF ENERGY DERIVATIVES 2-3 (2008), available at
http://ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/08Jun/RS21401.pdf.
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intend to perform but merely "to speculate in the rise or fall of prices" -are
illegal and unenforceable, and some uncertainty developed over whether these
new derivatives would be enforced the courts. Traditional futures, such as
those traded on CBOT, are regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission ("CFTC") and therefore exempt from the common law ban on
difference contracts. But energy futures and their ilk were not regulated by the
CFTC, potentially leaving parties without the option of legal enforcement.6
This legal uncertainty threatened the entire industry. Had a court ruled that an
energy future, for instance, was in fact an illegal difference contract, "trillions
of dollars in outstanding swaps could have been invalidated," potentially
causing enormous upheaval in the energy market and others. Fortunately, the
CFTC and Congress recognized the problem and quickly clarified the law to
make these novel derivatives enforceable. 6 6 This vignette shows that reliable
legal enforceability is, indeed, necessary to a functioning contract exchange.
This is not to say that contract exchange participants regularly sue each
other to enforce their contracts. The "shadow" of the law-the parties'
awareness that the contract could be enforced with all the power of the state if
necessary-is the important thing.
2. Useful Institutional Attributes
In addition to the two prerequisite institutional attributes discussed in the
previous Subsection, there are a number of characteristics that are valuable, but
not absolutely necessary, for a contract exchange to function.67 This Subsection
briefly highlights a few of the most useful and beneficial optional institutional
attributes of contract exchanges: clearinghouses, margin and membership
requirements, and price discovery. The traditional futures exchange possesses
all of these optional characteristics.
63. Stout, supra note 17, at 714-15; see also Irwin v. Williar, 110 U.S. 499, 510 (1884) ("[I]n
this country, all wagering contracts are held to be illegal and void as against public policy.").
64. Cristie Ford & Carol Liao, Power Without Property, Still: Unger, Berle, and the
Derivatives Revolution, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 889, 907 (2010) (noting that "parties [had] little legal
protection if a deal were to go sour").
65. JICKLING, supra note 62, at 3; Ford & Liao, supra note 64, at 907 (describing the "chaos"
that would ensue in financial markets if energy futures contracts were invalidated); Anna Stolley Persky,
Do the Math: The Role of Derivatives in Fiscal Fallout, WASH. LAWYER, June 2010, at 22, 27 ("[I]f
these swaps had been voidable, it would have created a crisis.").
66. JICKLING, supra note 62, at 3; Ford & Liao, supra note 64, at 907-08.
67. In this way, these attributes are akin to the trademarked tagline for BASF chemical
company, "At BASF, we don't make a lot of the products you buy. We make a lot of the products you
buy better." Registration No. 2,988,793.
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a. Clearinghouse
A clearinghouse is a legal entity that guarantees the performance of every
contract traded on an exchange.68 It provides this guarantee by formally
entering into both sides of every contract created on the exchange: "The
clearinghouse becomes the seller to the buyer of the contract, and the buyer to
the seller." 69 This guarantee facilitates a primary purpose of contract
exchanges, anonymous trading among strangers, 70 by eliminating "counterparty
risk," or the chance that one's contracting counterparty will fail to perform.71
This adds value to a contract exchange and benefits its participants. By
relieving participants of the need to conduct due diligence on their trading
partners, a clearinghouse reduces transaction costs. 72
In truth, counterparty risk can never truly be "eliminated." All a
clearinghouse really does is shift the locus of the risk to itself. "Because of the
clearinghouse, the two trading parties do not need to trust each other or even
know each other's identity. Instead, the two traders only have to be concerned
about the reliability of the clearinghouse." 73 Thus, the more confidence traders
have that the clearinghouse will perform its guarantee, the better the exchange
functions.
In the archetypical contract exchange, the futures exchange, the
clearinghouse has proved quite reliable. In the United States, at least, futures
clearinghouses are all well-capitalized and regulated entities that have always
performed as promised. There has never been an instance of a futures
clearinghouse default, even during the recent financial crisis.75 This has led
futures traders to put tremendous faith in their clearinghouses, 6 which has, in
turn, encouraged futures exchanges to flourish.
b. Margin
The reduction in risk offered by a clearinghouse is not cost-free, of course.
The clearinghouse, like any provider of insurance, will demand compensation
for guaranteeing the performance of every contract on the exchange. The usual
68. KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 5, at 9. A "guarantee" is a promise to perform in the event
that the primary obligor fails to do so. 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, § 6.3, at 107.
69. West, supra note 13, at 2587; see Romano, supra note 7, at 16-17.
70. See Tesler & Higinbotham, supra note 15.
71. KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 5, at 11.
72. Bums, supra note 35, at 34.
73. KoLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 5, at 11; id. at 9 ("[T]he clearinghouse substitutes its own
credibility for the promise of each trader in the market.").
74. Id. at 11.
75. Id.; Romano, supra note 7, at 21.
76. While this means that a clearinghouse's failure to perform when needed "would bring the
futures market to ruin," the risk of such an outcome is "very small." KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 5,
at i1.
77. See infra Section I.B.
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method for paying the clearinghouse is by requiring traders to transfer to the
clearinghouse some portion of their potential liability, called "margin," before
entering into any contracts. Margin serves as a bond to encourage traders to
perform their contract, as well as a means of funding the clearinghouse.
The level of margin required depends on the exchange. A typical futures
contract might require a margin of 5%, meaning that a trader would have to
post 5% of the current market value of a given contract before being allowed to
trade. If the market moves against the trader, the clearinghouse will require an
additional margin. This is called a "margin call." 79 The combination of margin
requirements and clearinghouses greatly enhances the ability of traders to
ignore counterparty risk when they trade.
c. Membership
Yet, another means for enhancing the ability of traders to ignore
counterparty risk is a rule that only approved parties (that is, members) may
trade on a contract exchange. In general, to qualify for membership, parties
must demonstrate their integrity and financial responsibility. This provides
traders with further comfort that counterparties can be trusted to perform their
contracts, even if it means suffering a significant loss.
d. Price Discovery
When two parties make or trade a contract on an exchange, the price is
generally posted for all traders to see. These prices can convey useful
information not only to exchange participants but also to others. 82 This is called
"price discovery." 83 For example, using the information contained in today's
futures prices, one can estimate what the price of a given commodity will be at
a given time in the future.84
The time-sensitive and valuable price information is often first posted on
the exchange, then conveyed to paying subscribers, and then, after a suitable
78. KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 5, at 12.
79. Id. at 12-13.
80. Id. at 4-6; Telser & Higinbotham, supra note 15, at 972-73.
81. 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 43, § 1.04[1], at 153 ("The rules of the derivatives
exchange set qualifications for membership that generally focus on matters of integrity and financial
responsibility.").
82. Telser & Higinbotham, supra note 15, at 997 ("[T]he transactions prices alone convey a
considerable amount of useful information to those who are not currently trading in the market.").
83. E.g., KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 5, at 24-25; Romano, supra note 7, at 14-15.
84. KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 5, at 25 (explaining how this "servels] a social purpose by
helping people. . . make their consumption and investment decisions more wisely").
85. See Bd. of Trade of the City of Chi. v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 250-51
(1905) (holding that CBOT's "collection of quotations is entitled to the protection of the law ... like a
trade secret"); KOLB & OvERDAHL, supra note 5, at 100 ("The sale of real-time transaction prices,
quotations, and other market data is a huge source of revenue for financial exchanges such as the ...
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delay, publicly disseminated.86 And so long as the information reaches the
public within some reasonable time, it redounds to the benefit of all, including
consumers and others with no direct connection with the exchange.
This public disclosure of transaction prices serves a valuable
democratizing function. 7 In the absence of such disclosure, the wealthy and
powerful possess significant informational advantages thanks to their
knowledge of market conditions. For example, a large corn dealer that buys
from many small farms understands the general state of the crop (and therefore
the likely level of supply at harvest time) much better than any of the individual
farmers.88 But a grain futures exchange places price information in the hands of
any farmer with access to a newspaper (or the Internet), thereby greatly
reducing the dealer's advantage vis-A-vis the farmers.89 For consumers, the
argument is a bit weaker. It is the rare motorist that consults the gasoline
futures market in January to decide whether to take a road trip in June. For this
reason, the benefit of price discovery for consumers is real, but modest.
B. Benefits and Costs
Contract exchanges, by providing competitive, liquid markets for entering
into and trading standardized contracts, yield a number of private and public
benefits, many of which have already been mentioned. The liquidity of the
market assures a fair price for all concerned, and the contracts traded can be
used for a variety of business purposes, most notably to hedge risk." Contract
exchanges also reduce transaction costs in a variety of ways, including
standardizing contracts and gathering buyers and sellers together in one place.91
CBOT."); see also Jason Zweig, Exchanges Pushed by a Need for Speed, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2011, at
Cl (recounting that at "the time of the Civil War, the New York Stock Exchange Board ... charged
outside brokers up to $100 to put their ears up to a keyhole where they could eavesdrop on trading
activity").
86. See KoLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 5, at 94 (noting that the Wall Street Journal "publishes
futures prices daily").
87. Stone, supra note 4, at 197 ("[B]oards of trade stand for equity.").
88. Cf Dana Cimilluca & Guy Chazan, IPO Sets the Stage for Deals, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27,
2011, at Cl (reporting that many of the world's largest commodities firms "aren't publicly traded and
often operate in great secrecy, benefiting from the often specialized knowledge they gain from both
producing and shipping goods around the world and adjusting quickly to rapid-fire changes in supply
and demand").
89. Stone, supra note 4, at 197 (noting that futures exchanges "bring[] to the knowledge of the
grain dealer and farmer all facts which are necessary for them to know, in order to arrive at the intrinsic
value of their grain").
90. West, supra note 13, at 2599; see also KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 5, at 6.
91. Bums, supra note 35, at 34 ("Most commentators regard futures markets as among the
most (if not the most) competitive markets in the world."); Richard A. Epstein, The Neoclassical
Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 803, 816 (2008); Stephen C. Pirrong, The
Efficient Scope of Private Transactions-Cost-Reducing Institutions: The Successes and Failures of
Commodity Exchanges, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 229, 232 (1995) ("[E]xchanges provide an extensive variety
of transactions-cost-reducing services."); Jeffrey C. Williams, The Origin of Future Markets, 56 AGRIC.
HIST. 306, 306 (1982) (noting that exchange-provided terms reduce participants' cost of negotiating
each bargain).
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They also provide a lawful and "legitimate outlet for speculative capital" by
providing a market able to absorb even very large transactions with little effect
on prices. 9 2 And for traders on exchanges that employ clearinghouses or margin
requirements, counterparty risk is greatly reduced. 93 Contract exchanges have
been shown to stabilize prices and reduce credit needs, time delays, and risk. 94
In short, contract exchanges facilitate efficient, anonymous transactions among
strangers to the great benefit of those who participate.95
Contract exchanges also confer benefits on nonparticipants, including
consumers, and are therefore in the public interest.96 Hence, the federal
government has encouraged or required contract exchanges on numerous
occasions over many years. 97 For one thing, contract exchanges help reduce the
incidence of scarcity and glut by providing insight into expected future market
conditions. This is particularly important with respect to agricultural
commodities, as scarcity could lead to famine. 99 And by quickly and efficiently
conveying useful information to myriad markets, contract exchanges are vitally
important to economic growth, which is in the public interest. 1 o
92. LURIE, supra note 4, at 27; Romano, supra note 7, at 32 ("In the public imagination,
speculator is a decidedly pejorative term. But the speculator's function in futures markets is absolutely
essential.").
93. Tesler & Higinbotham, supra note 15, at 997 (arguing that uncertainty about individuals
and their reliability in futures trading can be reduced by replacing their identity with that of the
institution or organized market).
94. E.g., KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 5, at 6, 25-30; Huseyin Leblebici & Gerald R.
Salancik, Stability in Interoganizational Exchanges: Rulemaking Processes of the Chicago Board of
Trade, 27 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 227, 230 (1982) ("[Ulncertainty about the future value of a transaction can be
reduced ... by introducing a standard futures contract."); Janet S. Netz, The Effect of Futures Markets
and Corners on Storage and Spot Price Variability, 77 AM. J. AGRIC. EcON. 182, 182 (1995) (noting
that futures markets reduce the risk of storing goods and reduce spot price volatility); Anthony
Neuberger & Stewart Hodges, How Large Are the Benefits from Using Options?, 37 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 201, 202 (2002) (noting that options "enable investors to control their
exposure to volatility risk"); Thomas Odle, Entrepreneurial Cooperation on the Great Lakes: The
Origins ofthe Methods ofAmerican Grain Marketing, 38 Bus. HIST. REV. 439, 439-55 (1964); Tesler &
Higinbotham, supra note 15, at 997; West, supra note 13, at 2599.
95. Telser & Higinbotham, supra note 15, at 997.
96. Sergio H. Lence, Do Futures Benefit Farmers?, 91 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 154, 154-67
(2009).
97. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 712, 124 Stat. 1376, 1641 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8302) (requiring that certain
derivatives be traded on a contract exchange, rather than over the counter, as in the past); Greely, supra
note 18, at 147 (describing Congress's passage of the Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970 whose
"stated intent . . . was to promote the development of a national secondary market in conventional
[residential] mortgages").
98. LURIE, supra note 4, at 24-26; Romano, supra note 7, at 12-13 ("Individuals with
information that the future direction of spot prices will be different from what current prices suggest will
trade in the futures markets. Their activity conveys information about prices and moves spot market
prices in the correct direction.").
99. See, e.g., ELENI Z. GABRE-MADHIN, WASH. INT'L FOOD POL'Y RESEARCH INST., MARKET
INSTITUTIONS, TRANSACTION COSTS, AND SOCIAL CAPITAL IN THE ETHIOPIAN GRAIN MARKET 124
(2001) (noting the lack of a functioning commodity contract markets contributed to 2003 Ethiopian
famine).
100. Stone, supra note 4, at 197 ("[The futures trading system] is in the interest of the general
prosperity, and of the common commercial welfare. It is an absolute economic necessity."); Charles
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Despite their general democratizing effect, however, traditional contract
exchanges have over time become dominated by wealthy and sophisticated
players.101 In part, this is because membership on a major contract exchange
can cost a million dollars or more.102 Moreover, even if membership were more
affordable, it is physically impossible to have more than a few dozen
individuals trading in a pit at any given time.o And while electronic trading
could allow for "virtual" trading pits of tremendous size, the traditional
exchanges still have only a very small number of seats.'1 The result is that
consumers cannot, and do not, directly participate in traditional contract
exchanges; only sophisticated professionals do. 105
That said, although they cannot trade directly on an exchange, consumers
(or farmers) can fairly easily trade contracts through a broker.106 This comes,
however, with a transaction fee.1o7 And whether the fee is large or small in an
absolute sense, it will certainly be more burdensome for smaller traders because
it will represent a larger percentage of their overall transaction. It might be
reasonable to hedge $10,000 worth of corn for a $100 fee, which is just 1% of
the total transaction. But for a very small farmer who expects to sell only $1000
of corn, the same $100 fee is 10% of the total transaction and likely
prohibitively expensive. That is, the farmer will not be able to hedge and will
be forced to take a chance on the spot market. The result is that anyone can
trade on traditional contract exchanges through a broker in theory, but in
practice it is generally not worthwhile for parties with small sums at stake-
such as consumers-to do so.
There are other costs to contract exchanges as well. They deny contracting
parties the ability to negotiate their agreements, making it impossible to
Wolf, Institutions and Economic Development, 45 AM. ECON. REv. 867, 867-68 (1955). One final
public benefit of contract exchanges may be that businesses can pass the savings of lower transaction
costs to consumers in the form of lower prices. But whether they will actually do so depends in large
measure on the state of competition, so exchanges may or may not provide this public benefit depending
on the specific market at issue. See infra text accompanying notes 255-259.
101. Kevin M. Foley, CFTC Reauthorization: A Chance To Fix What's Broken, MAG.
FUTURES INDUSTRY (Oct./Nov. 1998), http://www.futuresindustry.org/fi-magazine-
home.asp?a-489&iss=88 ("95 percent of all futures transactions are effected on behalf of professional
traders.").
102. KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 5, at 5; Seat Market Information, CBOE.COM,
http://www.cboe.com/aboutcboe/seats.aspx (last visited Feb. 22, 2011) (noting that a seat on CBOT sold
for more than $2 million on June 14, 2010).
103. See KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 5, at 69 (showing a diagram of a trading pit).
104. Id. at 5 ("Most futures trading volume now occurs on electronic trading platforms ...
owned and operated by the futures exchanges.").
105. Id. at 5; cf id. at 157 (reporting research showing that "professional futures traders think
differently than ordinary individuals"). See generally David L. Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft
Ltd., 923 F.2d 245, 245-53 (2d Cir. 1991) (describing metals futures trader as "sophisticated").
106. See Michael M. Phillips, Finance Overhaul Casts Long Shadow on the Plains, WALL ST.
J., July 14, 2010, at Al (describing Nebraska farmers hedging their crop by selling corn futures on
CBOT through a broker).
107. Recall that the broker paid a huge sum for a seat and needs to make that money back
through transaction fees. See sources cited supra note 102.
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precisely meet to their needs. A party might only want 100 pounds of butter,
but the standard CME contract, which is not negotiable, is for 40,000
pounds. os This is not only inconvenient, it is contrary to the core notion of
contracts as negotiated agreements. And a contract exchange may make it
easier for a single party to "corner the market" and then act in a monopolistic
fashion. 10
Contract exchanges also undermine companies' efforts to brand
themselves, thus snuffing out the ability of businesses to communicate useful
information, for example that their product is of reliably high quality.
Companies have an incentive to invest in quality if they can earn a return on
that investment in the form of consumer loyalty.110 But when a business is
commoditized-for example, every bushel of No. 2 Soft Red Winter wheat is
viewed as equivalent to every other-the incentive is to invest enough to make
the grade, and no further.
This effect has been on display in recent years in the airline industry.
Many consumers shop for airline tickets using online tools that rank offers by
price, thus treating them as fungible commodities. In response, many airlines
have taken to competing solely on the basis of price, leading to a widely
remarked upon negative effect on airline service: delays are common; meals
and drinks are no longer provided; and fees have been imposed to travel
standby, make a reservation by phone, or check luggage (or even, sometimes,
carry it on)."'
In addition, one must recognize what might be called ethical or moral
concerns over the standardization and commodification inherent in all contract
exchanges, in that they undermine diversity and regional variation. For
example, the great variety of crops that existed in nineteenth-century America
has been winnowed into just a handful of standardized varieties, leaving many
nostalgic for the "heirloom" varietals eaten by our forebears.112 Futures
108. CME RULEBOOK, supra note 9, § 5102.B.
109. See, e.g., Minpeco, S.A. v. Hunt, 718 F. Supp. 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (concerning a civil
action arising out of Hunt Brothers' infamous attempt to corner the silver market via COMEX futures);
EMILY LAMBERT, THE FuTuREs 10-13, 37-40 (2010) (describing numerous successful and unsuccessful
attempts to corner the market at CBOT and CME from as early as the 1880s).
110. See infra note 133.
111. See, e.g., Scott McCartney, The Math Behind New Baggage Fee, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29,
2010, at DI (reporting that a bill was introduced in Congress that would ban carry-on baggage fees);
Susan Stellin, Airline Fees Test Travelers' Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2010, at TR3 (cataloging ticket
change, standby travel, phone reservation and other fees imposed by airlines); Richard Zoglin, The
Airlines' Customer-Complaint Lines: No Answer, TIME.COM (Sept. 3, 2009),
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,19 2 0121,00.html.
112. MICHAEL POLLEN, THE BOTANY OF DESIRE 192-94, 225-29 (2002) (criticizing
"monoculture" and celebrating the many varieties of potatoes cultivated by the ancient Incas as "an
extraordinary cultural achievement and a gift of incalculable value to the rest of the world"); see CARY
FOWLER & PAT MOONEY, SHATTERING: FOOD, POLITICS, AND THE Loss OF GENETIC DIVERSITY (1990);
Nancy Lofholm, Foreseeding the Future: CSU Seed Bank Is Insurance Against Global Changes,
DENVER POST, Sept. 20, 2007, at Al ("[T]he 8,000 crop varieties that were growing in the U.S. in the
early 1900s have dwindled to 600.").
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exchanges are not the sole cause of this phenomenon-other likely culprits
include technology, culture, and patent law-but they have surely exacerbated
it by requiring uniformity of the underlying crops.
These costs of contract exchanges are real, but the benefits appear to be
overwhelming. The reduction of hunger as a social problem easily outweighs
the loss of certain varieties of fruits and vegetables, and lower prices for airline
tickets are considered by many, if not most, consumers to be worth the loss in
service.113 Thus, contract exchanges have long been broadly popular, and new
exchanges and contracts continue to develop.114 And for those consumers who
prefer (and wish to pay for) a higher level of service, they can eschew the
exchange and contract directly for branded goods and services, such as
heirloom tomatoes from a farmer's market or a first-class airline seat.1
Historically, the strongest opposition to contract exchanges has come from
entrenched interests that have some advantage or control in the relevant market.
They understand all too well that the introduction of a contract exchange will
whittle away their profit margins. In the 1950s, for instance, large onion
growers successfully lobbied Congress to ban onion futures." 7 More recently,
financial firms that design and trade complex derivatives (unsuccessfully)
fought legislation requiring that all such derivatives be traded on an
exchange," 8 and film producers (successfully) lobbied Congress to ban the
113. E.g., Scott McCartney, With Low Fares, Furor over Carry-On Fees Wanes, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 14, 2010, at D3 (reporting that Spirit Airlines's policy of charging up to $45 to carry luggage on
board, which had initially attracted the ire of consumers and Congress, has proved popular due to lower
ticket prices and fewer delays); Susan Stellin, When Is Cheap Not Enough?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2010,
at TR3 (stating that author purchased airline ticket from Spirit for $112 instead of from competitors that
charged nearly $600: "For that price difference ($500!), I was willing to make some sacrifices. . . .").
114. KoLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 5, at 19 ("Since the founding of the CBOT in 1848,
futures markets have flourished. The past three decades have been a period of extraordinary
growth .... .").
115. Some may worry that the market power of a contract exchange could crowd out
alternatives for those consumers that would have preferred to make individual contracts for branded
goods and services, leaving them no choice but to accept the commodified contract. This worry is a
valid concern in theory, but in practice, there seems to be no lack of individualized, branded options
where we already see exchanges, such as hotel rooms or airline tickets. See Stephen Heyman, Affordable
Boutique Hotels? in New York?, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2010, at TRI (reporting on a "huge wave of
consumer demand" for "boutique hotels" that offer "cool design" and "nods to local flavor"); Holman
W. Jenkins, Jr., The Airlines Discover "Content," WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2011, at All (describing
attempts by airlines to "de-commodify the basic airline seat" and "to cozy up to the customer so he can
be sold more and more services").
116. Blinder, supra note 17 ("[S]tandardized, exchange-traded products . . . squeeze profit
margins to the bone."). See generally Epstein, supra note 91, at 817 ("People in any mainstream
business call something a 'commodity' because imitation and dissemination have sucked out all the
monopoly rents from the project.").
117. Richard S. Higgins & Randall G. Holcombe, The Effect of Futures Trading on Price
Variability in the Market for Onions, 8 ATL. ECON. J. 44, 50-51 (1980) (noting that although onion
futures gave "smaller producers ... an alternative to selling to the [dominant] larger producers" and
provided "readily available information about expected spot prices," large producers successfully
lobbied Congress to ban onion futures); see 7 U.S.C. § 13-1 (2006) (banning onion futures).
118. Blinder, supra note 17 ("Derivatives dealers have already shed crocodile tears over the
alleged benefits of customization . . . .").
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trading of futures on Hollywood movies' box-office receipts." 9 These
interested parties recognize that they stand to lose from the establishment of a
contract exchange. But their loss is the public's gain.
It is true that certain derivatives-credit default swaps and mortgage-
backed securities-have been subject to much criticism of late as a possible
cause of the recent financial crisis. But any such problems were generally
absent in standardized contracts traded on organized contract exchanges (for
example, those for "conforming" mortgages) and rather were found in
customized contracts not traded on exchanges (such as "subprime" mortgages).
Hence, far from eschewing contract exchanges, the new Dodd-Frank Act
requires much more extensive use of them. 12 0
On balance, contract exchanges are strongly in the public interest.121 One
significant shortcoming, however, is that consumers have not had the
opportunity to directly participate.122 But a new form of contract exchange, one
focused on consumer contracts, has recently appeared to fill that gap.
C. Consumer Contract Exchanges
Contract exchanges have traditionally been located in large "exchange
halls" in major cities.123 Because space is limited in even the largest halls, only
a relatively small group of people can directly participate in a traditional
contract exchange.12 4 The result is that wealthy and sophisticated parties have
long reaped the many benefits of participating in contract exchanges, but
ordinary consumers have not.
Over the past decade, however, inexpensive and widespread access to the
Internet has rendered physical constraints irrelevant for many purposes.125 A
119. Michael Cieply, No Future for Box Office Exchanges, N.Y. TIMES MEDIA DECODER (July
16, 2010, 9:55 AM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/20l0/07/16/no-future-for-box-office-
exchanges ("Plans to open exchanges that would trade in movie box-office flutures . . . ran into
Congressional opposition as film studios, theater owners and organizations representing directors and
other workers lobbied fiercely against the exchanges," and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 was drafted with
"a provision banning the proposed practice.").
120. See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, For Derivatives, Law Could Bring New Light, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBOOK (July 16, 2010, 4:21 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/07/16/for-derivatives-
law-could-bring-new-light/ (noting that the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 "requires that standardized
derivatives contracts be traded on an open exchange, with prices and volumes reported publicly").
121. Telser & Higinbotham, supra note 15, at 971 (providing "a theory of the net benefit of an
organized exchange").
122. See supra text accompanying notes 101-107.
123. See Bd. of Trade of City ofChi. v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 245 (1905)
(The "main feature" of CBOT is that "it maintains an exchange hall for the exclusive use of its
members, which now has become one of the great grain and provision markets of the world. Three
separated portions of this hall are known respectively as the wheat pit, the corn pit, and the provision
pit.").
124. Cf LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 59 (1999) (noting that
the "architecture" of the Internet constrains what users can and cannot do).
125. Indeed, most futures contracts are traded today on electronic trading platforms, rather
than via the "open outcry" method. KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 5, at 5.
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contract exchange no longer needs to have a physical location to bring traders
together in one place.12 6 A web-based contract exchange can be just as
centralized and organized as a physical one, if not more so. And this has made
possible a new form of contract exchange-one without seats or members that
invites consumers to participate.127
This new form-a "consumer contract exchange"-is an exciting
development that holds the promise of bringing the liquidity, price discovery,
and other benefits of contract exchanges directly to consumers. Anyone who
has ever used Priceline to "name their own price" for an airline ticket or
Hotwire to book a room without knowing the identity of the hotel has
experienced the power of consumer contract exchanges. And these primitive
consumer contract exchanges may prove to be just the beginning of a new way
for consumers to flex their collective bargaining power.
This Section recognizes several extant consumer contract exchanges and
describes their institutional structures in terms of the definition and institutional
attributes established in Section I.A.128 It begins with exchanges for consumer-
to-business contracts and then moves on to exchanges for consumer-to-
consumer contracts.
1. Consumer-to-Business Contract Exchanges
Consumers understand the value of subjecting the businesses they deal
with to intense price competition.129 As a result, contract exchanges for
consumer-to-business transactions have flourished on the Internet. In general,
these exchanges consist of a website where a consumer can make a request for
a generic good or service and receive a number of offers from businesses
competing to fulfill the request. The result, as predicted by theory, 30 is that
consumers obtain exceptionally attractive prices and interest rates.
a. Priceline and Hotwire
Two of the oldest and most popular consumer-to-business contract
exchanges are Priceline and Hotwire, both of which provide a marketplace for
fungible travel services, such as a two-star hotel room in a given neighborhood,
126. All of the consumer contract exchanges known to this author exist only on the Internet.
127. This can be seen as a specific instance of the broader phenomenon of"disintermediation"
that is endemic to the Internet. See Andrew L. Shapiro, Digital Middlemen and the Architecture of
Electronic Commerce, 24 OHION.U. L. REv. 795, 795-801 (1998) (explaining that disintermediation is a
term "used in cyber circles to describe the bypassing of middlemen that technology allows").
128. See supra Section L.A.
129. See, e.g., WHEN BANKS COMPETE, YOU WIN, Registration No. 2,440,603 (slogan of
LendingTree online mortgage marketplace).
130. See supra Section I.B.
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a certain size rental car, or an airline ticket. 131 On Hotwire, a consumer enters
basic information, and businesses present offers for the consumer to accept or
reject. The twist is that the consumer is not told the name of the company
making the offer, only that it is a reputable brand-name company.' 32
Take for example a request to rent a compact car at the Miami airport for
two days. The consumer will receive anonymous offers at a variety of prices
and will generally select the lowest price. Once the consumer has accepted the
offer, the name of the company (Avis, Budget, and the like) with whom he just
contracted is revealed. Priceline works similarly, except that it uses a "name
your own price" method, whereby it is the consumer that makes an offer to an
anonymous group of vendors who are then free to accept or reject it.
It is important to note the distinction between contract exchanges like
Hotwire and Priceline, on the one hand, and other travel services websites such
as Expedia, Orbitz, or Kayak, on the other. These latter websites operate in
much the same way as Hotwire or Priceline, except they lack the all-important
aspect of anonymity. A consumer that makes a request on one of these sites to
rent a compact car for two days is told the brand name behind each offer. On
Kayak, a consumer seeking to rent a car might be given the alternative of a $50
price from a "premium" brand like Hertz, and a $45 price from a "value" brand
like Thrifty-and may well end up going with Hertz, thanks to the value of its
brand.133 Contrast that one-to-one transaction with the operation of the contract
exchange on Hotwire, where the consumer is not told the name of the service
providers making offers of $45 or $50 for the same compact car for the same
two days. The consumer is sure to select the $45 option and, unknowingly,
select Thrifty. This little difference separates a contract exchange like Hotwire
from an ordinary marketplace like Kayak.134 By keeping the brand opaque,
Hotwire allows and requires consumers to treat the car rental like a generic
commodity and compare offers purely on the basis of price.
A consumer who contracts via Hotwire implicitly accepts and agrees that
all two-star hotel rooms within a neighborhood, compact rental cars, or coach
airline tickets are identical in all material aspects. It is easy to point out that this
131. Note that transactions on Hotwire and Priceline are contracts, not present sales, because
they always contemplate performance in the future, such as a flight booked on a fiture date. See 1
FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, § 1.1, at 4-5.
132. 10 Tips to a Great Hotel Rate, CONSUMER REPORTS,
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine-archive/2010/june/shopping/hotels/I0-tips-to-a-great-
rate/index.htm (last updated June 2010) (noting that on Priceline or Hotwire, "the identity of your hotel
doesn't become known until after you complete a nonrefundable transaction").
133. See Susan Simpson & Jennifer Palmer, Proposal Greeted with Excitement, Worry in
Tulsa, OKLAHOMAN, Apr. 27, 2010, at IB (reporting on the differing brand identities of car rental
companies). See generally HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE EcoNoMics 448-53 (5th ed. 1999) (noting
that many firms "invest heavily in creating a distinctive brand identity" so that they can obtain higher
prices for their goods or services than is available for commodified equivalents).
134. By way of analogy, Kayak is like a farmer's market where individual farmers offer their
own crops for sale, and Hotwire is like CBOT, where everyone is hawking the same crops, which are
stored in a warehouse nearby.
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is emphatically not true; there are many small differences in the underlying
subject matters of these contracts. Just as one bushel of No. 2 Soft Red Winter
wheat will differ slightly from another, so too, one two-star hotel room will
vary from another. But the important consideration is that the consumer, in
deciding purely on price, knowingly treats them as if they were identical. And
for a consumer that prefers to deal with a specific company, they can do so
directly (or via Kayak) off the exchange, albeit almost certainly for a higher
price.135
The first necessary institutional attribute of all contract exchanges, namely
the use of standardized contracts, is found on Priceline and Hotwire. In both
cases, the terms of service act as a standard form contract to which all exchange
participants must adhere.' 37 Both exchanges also display the other necessary
institutional attribute: reliably enforceable contracts. On both exchanges, the
consumer must make payment in full at the time of contracting, leaving only
the service provider's performance outstanding.13 8 The upshot is that there is
never any need to enforce the contract against consumers, for they have already
paid in full. And in the usual case, service providers perform with the same
regularity as in other contexts. Hence, the contracts created on these exchanges
are reliably enforceable, as they must be.
As for the optional institutional attributes of contract exchanges, Priceline
and Hotwire make scant use of them.' 39 First, there is no clearinghouse that
guarantees performance (although the credit card companies can be seen as
playing a related role).1 '0 Second, there is no use of margin; to the contrary, the
consumer must pay the entire contract price immediately upon making the
contract. Alternatively, this can be seen as a margin requirement of 100%.
Third, there are no membership requirements on the consumer side; anyone
with a credit card is welcome to participate.141 On the business side, however,
Priceline and Hotwire screen their membership and only allow "brand name"
companies "you know and trust" to participate.14 2
135. See 10 Tips to a Great Hotel Rate, supra note 132.
136. See supra Subsection I.A.I.a.
137. See Terms of Use, HOTWIRE, http://www.hotwire.com/travel-information/terms.jsp (last
visited Mar. 29, 2011); Terms & Conditions, PRICELINE,
http://www.priceline.com/privacypolicy/termsen.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2011).
138. 10 Tips to a Great Hotel Rate, supra note 132 (noting that Priceline and Hotwire both
require "a nonrefundable transaction"). Thus, the contracts made on Priceline and Hotwire are all
unilateral (promise-for-performance), as opposed to bilateral (promise-for-promise), contracts. See 1
FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, § 3.4, at 189.
139. See supra Subsection I.A.2.
140. Priceline and Hotwire both affirmatively disclaim any such role. See sources cited supra
note 137.
141. For consumers that lack credit cards, Hotwire extends credit via a so-called "Bill Me
Later" feature, subject to credit approval. See What Is Bill Me Later?, HOTWIRE,
http://www.hotwire.com/helpcenter/payment-billingbill-me-later/what-is.jsp (last visited Feb. 22,
2011).
142. New to Hotwire?, HOTWIRE, http://www.hotwire.com/newtohotwire/index.jsp (last
visited Mar. 22, 2011).
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Fourth, neither Priceline nor Hotwire posts prices at which transactions
are made, so there is no price discovery on these exchanges.14 3 This is a real
and significant shortcoming because it undermines a key public benefit of
contract exchanges, but perhaps it will be remedied as these consumer contract
exchanges mature. After all, there was a time when CBOT banned telegraphs
and soaped up its windows to prevent the public dissemination of trading
prices.144
Finally, because contract exchanges have efficiency advantages over other
methods of contracting, we should expect that consumers that use Priceline or
Hotwire will obtain lower prices than are available elsewhere. 14 5 And this is
indeed borne out in practice: Consumer Reports has found that prices obtained
by consumers on Priceline and Hotwire are the most attractive anywhere,
online or off. An extensive 2003 report on the major travel websites concluded:
"In all three sectors of this testing-airlines, hotels, and car rentals-either
Priceline or Hotwire provided the highest number and percentage of lowest
rates." 4 6 Hence, just as theory predicts, consumers-at least that significant
group that considers price to be the most important consideration 47-are
benefiting from their participation in these new consumer contract
exchanges. 148
b. MoneyAisle
Another example of a consumer-to-business contract exchange is
MoneyAisle, a "next-generation online auction marketplace" where consumers
can invest in a CD or savings account at a federally insured bank or credit
union. The interest rate on the account is determined by "having banks and
credit unions actively bid against each other in live auctions for each individual
143. Anecdotal reports indicate that prices obtained on either exchange are sometimes shared
on blogs or online message boards, but there is no known systematic reporting of transaction prices. See,
e.g., RDU-Extended Stay Hotels $28 on Hotwire, FLYERTALK, http://www.flyertalk.com/forumI/hotel-
deals/Il 61828-rdu-extended-stay-hotels-28-hotwire.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2011) (reporting Hotwire
transaction to fellow travellers).
144. KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 5, at 100.
145. See supra Section I.B.
146. WILLIAM J. MCGEE, CONSUMER REPORTS WEBWATCH, BOOKING AND BIDDING IN THE
BLIND: AN IN-DEPTH EXAMINATION OF OPAQUE TRAVEL WEB SITES (2008), available at
http://www.consumerwebwatch.org/dynamic/travel-report-booking-bidding.cfm. For a more recent
report, see 10 Tips to a Great Hotel Rate, supra note 132 ("[D]iscount sites such as Priceline and
Hotwire [a]re the only surefire way to reap substantially lower room rates. Respondents who reserved a
room at an upscale hotel through a discounter paid an average daily rate of $80. Those who phoned the
hotel or booked online by other means paid about $120 for a comparable room.").
147. Vic Kolenc, Holiday Survival: Stores Get Competitive To Bring in Shoppers, EL PASO
TIMES (Nov. 21, 2010), http://www.elpasotimes.com/business/ci_16668362 (noting that in a national
survey of consumers, 54.5% said price, in the form of "sales, discounts or everyday low prices," is "the
most important factor[] in choosing where they shop").
148. See supra Section I.B.
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consumer request." 4 9 The competitive bidding is a boon for consumers, who
receive attractive rates.1so In fact, the process drives rates so high that banks,
especially name brand banks, have generally declined to participate."' This
effect is consistent with the historical treatment of contract exchanges by
entrenched market players.' 52 Fortunately, there appear to be enough credit
unions willing to participate for the exchange to work well.15 3
MoneyAisle possesses both of the required institutional attributes of all
contract exchanges. First, the contracts offered, savings accounts and CDs, are
sufficiently standardized by federal banking regulations as to be fungible. The
MoneyAisle consumer treats the savings accounts and CDs from one bank or
credit union as equivalent to those of another and compares them solely on the
basis of interest rate.154
Second, similar to Hotwire and Priceline, the contracts created on
MoncyAisle are of the unilateral variety, as consumers must pony up their
funds at the time of contracting. There is no further promise for them to
perform. So the only question of enforceability is against the bank, and there is
no doubt that a promise by a bank to a consumer to pay a certain rate on a CD
is a reliably enforceable promise.
As for the optional attributes of contract exchanges, MoneyAisle does
have a clearinghouse and membership requirements, but it has no control over
either one. In this case, federal insurance agencies-the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") for banks and the National Credit Union
Administration ("NCUA") for credit unions-play both roles. Those federal
agencies guarantee bank and credit union performance up to $250,000. And
149. Anne Eisenberg, Do I Hear 4%? On This Site, Banks Bid for Your Cash, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 28, 2008, at BU4 ("When people come to the site shopping for a C.D. or a high-yield savings
account, the banks engage in a fast-moving auction. A hundred banks may bid in the first round, 80 in
the second round, 50 in the third, until the bank with the highest offer wins the auction. As the bids rise,
the interest rates click past on the screen like numbers on the gauge of a gas pump. The customer can
take the final deal or leave it. There's no charge."); Lauren Rosen, Three Reasons Why You Should
Consider Refinancing an Auto Loan, MONEYAISLE (Sept. 7, 2010), available at
http://www.moneyaisle.com/content/three-reasons-why-you-should-consider/; see also Ray Birch,
Consumers Can Now Find CUs in the MoneyAisle, 14 CREDIT UNION J., May 17, 2010, at 4 ("All deals
are subject to verification, and if consumers have not been truthful or accurate in sharing their credit
score, the offer is either withdrawn or the rate changes.").
150. Eisenberg, supra note 149; Frequently Asked Questions, MONEYAISLE,
http://www.moneyaisle.com/help/faq (last visited Mar. 29, 2011) ("[B]y having banks and credit unions
compete for your specific business in live auctions . . . they are compelled to give you the best available
rates.").
151. Birch, supra note 149 ("Fewer than 10 banks [and none of the "mega-banks"] are
currently participating.").
152. See supra text accompanying notes 116-119.
153. Birch, supra note 149 (noting that 85 credit unions "have signed up and 110 are in the
pipeline"); see infra note 158.
154. See Jennifer Saranow Schultz, The Best Savings Account Rates: An Ongoing Quest, N.Y.
TIMES BucKs BLOG (Oct. 29, 2009, 12:45 PM), http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/29/the-best-
savings-account-rates-an-ongoing-quest/ (explaining how consumer-author was conducting an online
search for either a savings account or a six-month CD and "compared offerings based on their A.P.Y., or
annual percentage yield").
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MoneyAisle only permits members of the FDIC or NCUA to participate in its
exchange.155 These institutional attributes serve to minimize consumers'
counterparty risk, though they have not completely eliminated at least the
perception of such risk. 1 6
Theory predicts that the use of a contract exchange should result in
MoneyAisle offering rates to consumers that are more attractive than those
available anywhere off the exchange. 1s And this is precisely what is observed,
at least anecdotally.'5 9 Moreover, many of the concerns over standardization
and commodification raised above, such as concerns over the loss of heirloom
varieties or poor service,' 5 9 are plainly not relevant to a contract exchange for
simple financial products like CDs. In sum, MoneyAisle's consumer contract
exchange is a big win for consumers.
These consumer-to-business contract exchanges are useful and beneficial,
but they are all relatively primitive. They offer only primary markets in
unilateral contracts and make only limited use of valuable optional institutional
attributes such as margin. Many more complex consumer-to-business contract
exchanges can surely be conceived.
For example, a secondary market is possible. A consumer that contracted
on Hotwire for a hotel room might wish to sell to another the contractual right
to use the room.160 Alternatively, the hotel might decide that it no longer wants
to rent the room for the contracted-for price and would prefer to assign the
contract to another (equivalent) hotel. Bilateral contracts are possible, probably
in connection with margin requirements. Hotwire could allow consumers to
enter into true bilateral contracts using a margin of, say, 50%, meaning they
would pay half at the time of contracting and half at the time of performance. 161
155. What Is MoneyAisle?, MONEYAISLE, http://www.moneyaisle.com/aboutus/76 (last
visited Mar. 29, 2011).
156. Eisenberg, supra note 149 (noting that one "drawback[]" of MoneyAisle is that it asks
"consumers to apply for a product online with a provider they don't know").
157. See supra Section I.B.
158. See Jenn Abelson, Point. Click. Bank. And Save., BOS. GLOBE, Feb. 8, 2009, at GI
("During my own auction for a $10,000 high-yield savings account, 68 banks submitted 138 bids during
12 rounds. First Trade Union Bank offered a 3.25 percent rate, well above national and state averages.");
Eisenberg, supra note 149 ("I tried out MoneyAisle about three weeks ago, using the example of a six-
month, $10,000 CD.. . . I was offered 4.2 percent, well above the national average at the time of 3.15
percent."). This author confirms similar results on various occasions, but is unaware of any rigorous
empirical study on point.
159. See supra Section I.B.
160. Cf MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS 182-84 (6th ed. 2010) (framing Krell v. Henry, 2 K.B. 740 (1903), as a case in which
"Henry was 'long' I two-day lease on a flat in Pall Mall"; had the coronation gone forward as
scheduled, Henry might have sold his lease in a secondary market).
161. That would presumably be at time of check-out. See generally Coletti v. Knox Hat Co.,
169 N.E. 648, 649 (N.Y. 1930) ("When the performance of a contract consists in doing (faciendo) on
one side and in giving (dando) on the other side, the doing must take place before the giving.").
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All of these more complex forms are possible in theory, but as far as
research reveals, none currently exist.162 This Article contends that their
absence is due, at least in part, to the fact that contracts of adhesion are not
reliably enforceable against consumers. This last point is explored more fully in
Section II.B.
2. Consumer-to-Consumer Contract Exchanges
A consumer-to-consumerl63 contract exchange is one where consumers
make contracts with one another or trade those contracts on an organized
exchange. This type of exchange has only appeared in the past few years, and
only on the web; this is likely related to the recent widespread adoption of high-
speed Internet service over the past few years.1
a. eBay
eBay is a tremendously successful online bazaar where consumers make
contracts with one another for the sale of goods, often in an auction format. 6 5
To participate, one must register with an e-mail address and agree to eBay's
User Agreement and its Rules & Policies,'6 which include standard contract
terms to govern the contracts created on the site.' 67 The consumer-to-consumer
contracts created on eBay are true bilateral contracts, as they contain promises
of future performance on both sides: the buyer promises to pay, and the seller
promises to ship the item. 168 eBay profits by exacting a small toll on every
transaction on its site; it does not itself buy or sell anything, nor is it a party to
the contracts made.
162. Hotwire's standard form contract expressly forbids a secondary market. Hotwire Travel
Products Rules and Restrictions, HOTWIRE, http://www.hotwire.com/about-hotwire/other-
resources/hotwireAgreement.jsp (last visited Mar. 29, 2011) ("All bookings are final and cannot be
changed, refunded, exchanged, cancelled, or transferred to another party.").
163. The equivalent terms "peer-to-peer," "person-to-person," and "P2P" are sometimes used.
E.g., Fara S. Sunderji, Protecting Online Auction Sites from the Contributory Trademark Liability
Storm: A Legislative Solution to the Tiffany Inc. v. eBay Inc. Problem, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 909, 913
n.33 (2005) (describing eBay as a "person-to-person" market).
164. AARON SMITH, PEw RESEARCH CTR.'S INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, HOME
BROADBAND 2010, at 6 (2010), available at
http://www.pewinternet.org/-/media//Files/Reports/2010/Home%20broadband%202010.pdf (reporting
that the percentage of Americans with broadband Internet access grew from 16% in 2003 to 66% in
2010, based on survey data).
165. See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 96-97 (2d Cir. 2010) (describing eBay).
166. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting that
eBay requires all users "to register with eBay and sign eBay's User Agreement").
167. E.g., Unpaid Item Policy, EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/unpaid-item.html
(last visited Feb. 22, 2011) (giving buyers four days to pay for items).
168. See Invalid Bid Retraction Policy, EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/invalid-bid-
retraction.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2011) ("A bid is a binding contract between a buyer and a seller. It's
important to honor this contract.").
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So, is eBay a contract exchange? No. The first prerequisite of a contract
exchange is the use of nonnegotiable standardized contracts for fungible subject
matter.169 But the contracts between buyers and sellers on eBay are highly
customizable and negotiable in any number of ways, such as the shipping
method and forms of acceptable payment, and the underlying goods for sale are
not uniform. 170 In short, because contracts consummated on eBay are
negotiable, not standardized, and because the underlying subject matter is
variable, eBay is not a contract exchange.
That said, eBay does exhibit several of the institutional attributes of
contract exchanges. First, eBay contracts are reliably enforceable. This is not to
say that every eBay contract is performed-in fact, many are breached-but
merely that courts will respect and endeavor to enforce them just as they would
any ordinary contract. 71 Second, eBay employs membership requirements to
ameliorate counterparty risk. All participants are required to register with eBay
before consummating any contracts and assign themselves a "screen name" so
that their behavior in the eBay marketplace can be reviewed by other
participants in a public "feedback score."1 7 2 As a party with a low feedback
score may find it hard to find anyone willing to deal with them, this provides an
informal means of enforcing contracts and deterring breach. Third, the live
auctions and goods for sale on eBay may be observed by anyone with a web
browser; there is no need to register. By letting even nonmembers observe the
bids, asks, and transaction prices in real time, eBay benefits the general public
through price discovery. 173 For example, someone seeking to hold a "garage
sale" might rely on eBay to determine reasonable prices for household items.174
In this way, an active, liquid market on eBay not only benefits direct
participants but also is in the broader public interest. And eBay is certainly an
active, liquid market-there are more than 90 million active traders on the site,
and $2000 worth of goods are sold every second.17 1
In sum, eBay is not truly a consumer contract exchange, but it does
possess some of the key institutional attributes of such exchanges and yields
some of their benefits.
169. See supra Subsection I.A.I.a.
170. See Selling Practices Policy, EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/selling-
practices.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2011) (requiring sellers to include such specifications in their
listings); see also Dedvukaj v. Maloney, 447 F. Supp. 2d 813, 816-17 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (noting that
seller required "international bidders to provide money orders using United States funds and to e-mail
for shipping quotes"); Gossett v. HBL, LLC, No. 2:06-123-CWH, 2006 WL 1328757, at *4 (D.S.C.
May 11, 2006) (explaining that the parties' written Purchase Agreement modified the eBay contract for
an expensive car).
171. See, e.g., Dedvukaj, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 816-17 (enforcing a contract consummated on
eBay); Gossett, 2006 WL 1328757, at *7 (same); see also Invalid Bid Retraction Policy, supra note 168.
172. The score is depicted by a small graphical star whose color indicates the level of positive
feedback a user has received.
173. See Epstein, supra note 91, at 816.
174. This benefit is equally available to the garage-sale shoppers, ofcourse.
175. eBay: Who We Are, EBAY, http://www.ebayinc.com/who (last visited on Mar. 29, 2011).
342
Vol. 28, 2011
Consumer Contract Exchanges
b. Prosper
Prosper, founded in 2006, is "the largest peer-to-peer lending
marketplace" in the world where consumers pool their money online to make
small unsecured loans to one another.' 76 Prosper is open to anyone who wishes
to lend and borrowers with a decent credit score.' 77 To date, more than one
million consumers have joined Prosper, lending and borrowing more than $200
million. 7 1
At Prosper and other peer-to-peer lending markets,179 consumers can
obtain loans directly from one another without going through a middleman.' 80
Prosper is, in a sense, a stripped-down form of banking. Conceptually, a bank
borrows from a group of people at one rate and then, selectively and serially,
lends back to that same group at a higher rate. Prosper aims to cut out the
intermediary bank and allow people to lend directly to one another. Or, perhaps
more accurately, Prosper's aim is not to destroy the intermediary, but rather to
become it. It presently charges borrowers up to a 3% servicing fee, and
lenders a 1% servicing fee. But this approximately 1% or 2% transaction cost is
almost certainly a much tighter spread than is usual for traditional banks, which
might pay depositors 3% and lend to them at 7%. In any event, despite
Prosper's similarities to a bank, the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") determined that the loans originated and traded on Prosper are
securities and subject to SEC regulation. 182
To borrow money on Prosper, one creates an online listing that includes
the amount and purpose of the loan and an optional photograph. In Prosper's
original incarnation, borrowers would indicate their maximum rate and lenders
would bid against one another to offer the lowest interest rate in an auction
format. This auction format was discontinued in late 2010 and replaced with
176. Company Overview, PROSPER, http://www.prosper.com/about/ (last visited Apr. 17,
2011).
177. Borrowers must meet the minimum credit score requirement of 640. Press Release,
Prosper Marketplace Inc., Prosper's SEC Registration Declared Effective (July 13, 2009), available at
http://www.prosper.com/about/mediapress-releases.aspx?t-Prosper's_SEC_Registration-Declared
Effective. Nationally, credit scores range from 300-850, with a median of 723. Kenneth R. Harney, New
Mortgages Worry Regulators, WASH. POST, June 10, 2006, at F3. Thus, a score of 640 indicates a
borrower whose creditworthiness is well below average but far from the worst.
178. Company Overview, supra note 176.
179. Other peer-to-peer lending marketplaces include LendingClub and Zopa. See Phyllis
Furman, More Entrepreneurs Use the Web To Attract Lendors and Investors, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec.
14, 2009, http://articles.nydailynews.com/2009-12-14/news/i 7942825_1_business-owners-
entrepreneurs-small-businesses.
180. Id.
181. Robert Schmidt & Jesse Westbrook, 'Peer Lender' Asks To Be Regulated as a Bank To
Escape Regulation by SEC, BLOOMBERG, June 10, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-
10/-peer-lender-asks-to-be-regulated-as-a-bank-to-escape-regulation-by-sec.html ("This is as simple a
version of banking as you can get.").
182. Prosper Marketplace, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 8984, 2008 SEC LEXIS 2791, at 2
(Nov. 24, 2008).
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interest rates set by Prosper based on the borrower's financial status and credit
history. 83 Lenders can put as little as $25 into a loan and, if enough of them
invest to meet the full amount sought by the borrower (say, $2000), then the
loan will fund and the borrower will make payments to each of the lenders over
the life of the loan.'8 Apart from the amount and interest rate, all contractual
terms-term of loan, choice of law, acceleration clause, and the like-are fixed
in a standard form promissory note drafted by Prosper.
All of this is to say that Prosper is a consumer-to-consumer contract
exchange that displays both of the required characteristics of all contract
exchanges. First, the promissory notes on Prosper are all on the same standard
form.'85  Second, the promissory notes have proven sufficiently reliably
enforceable for the exchange to function. This is not to say that every loan on
Prosper is repaid-in fact, the default rate is fairly high.'86 But this has nothing
to do with the legal enforceability of the promissory notes; rather, it is a
function of the precarious financial position of many Prosper borrowers.' 87
Prosper bears many similarities to the consumer contract exchanges
considered thus far. But Prosper has gone a step farther than the others by
establishing a secondary market. This is a relatively new phenomenon, having
been introduced in 2009. Up to that point, lenders were stuck for the full term
of each loan with no way to sell or transfer them. This illiquidity was a frequent
subject of lender complaints, 8 8 and finally, after Prosper registered, with the
SEC, a secondary market was established. This was only possible, as should be
clear by now, because all of the loan agreements created on Prosper are
standardized. The new secondary market has operated relatively well to date.
Because there are so many lenders on Prosper, it is a highly competitive
market. Thus, one should expect that borrowers are receiving all, or nearly all,
183. See Press Release, Prosper Marketplace Inc., Prosper Reports 17% Increase in Loans in
November (Dec. 20, 2010), available at
http://www.prosper.com/about/Mediajpress-releases.aspx?t-ProsperReportsI 7%25_IncreaseinLoa
ns inNovember (announcing change).
184. Just like at CBOT, there are actually two contracts, one between the lender and Prosper,
and another between Prosper and the borrower. But they function effectively as a single contract; that is,
if the borrower defaults, the lender suffers the loss.
185. See Sample Promissory Note, PROSPER,
http://www.prosper.com/legal/promissory note-sample.aspx (last visited Mar. 29, 2011).
186. Of the $223 million loaned on Prosper, $46 million worth has defaulted (been "charged
off"). Performance Data-Prosper, PROSPER, http://www.prosper.com/invest/performance.aspx (last
visited Mar. 16, 2011). And, of that $46 million, only $2 million has been recovered in judicial
proceedings. Id.; see also Harriet Johnson Brackey, Lending Networks Thrive on the Web, SUN-
SENTINAL (Miami), Apr. 13, 2008, at ID (reporting that "6.6 percent of [Prosper] loans are 30 days late
and 4.9 percent of [Prosper] loans have defaulted," compared with "a 2.65 percent delinquency rate on
all consumer loans from banks").
187. Pamela Yip, Net Worth Networks, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 11, 2008, at ID
(describing Prosper borrowers as "people in desperate times who just can't get loans elsewhere").
188. E.g., A Prosper Lender-Six Months Later, HEALTHY READER, Apr. 9, 2008,
http://www.healthyreader.com/2008/04/09/prosper-lender-investing-experience/ ("The biggest hang-up I
have with Prosper is that my money is tied up for 3 years once invested.").
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of the liquidity benefits of a secondary market in the form of lower interest
rates. 189
As for the optional attributes of such exchanges, Prosper does not employ
a clearinghouse or margin, which makes sense in the context of a lending
market. The whole idea is that lenders are pricing the risk of each individual
borrower. It does, however, have an important membership requirement:
extremely risky borrowers with credit scores of under 640 may not participate.
And, like eBay, Prosper provides the public with price discovery by allowing
anyone to observe the active bids-though it reserves detailed credit
information about borrowers for members only.
Separate from these public benefits, theory predicts that Prosper, as a
contract exchange, should deliver significant benefits to the consumers that
choose to participate.190 And empirical evidence bears this out: independent
reports indicate that borrowers on Prosper receive better interest rates than are
available from a bank or other financial institution,' 9' and that lenders receive a
relatively attractive rate of return on their investments. 192 Furthermore, Prosper
has led to other benefits for participants, perhaps most notably a marked
decrease in racial, gender, or other discrimination.' 93
Prosper has democratizing aspirations and is specifically targeted at
consumers whose alternative sources of lending might include ultra-high
interest payday loans.194 By harnessing the power of the contract exchange,
Prosper offers attractive interest rates to borrowers with checkered credit
histories, thereby benefiting the most vulnerable members of society.
189. An empirical assessment of this claim would be difficult. One could compare interest
rates paid before and after the introduction of the secondary market. However, the former group of loans
were all made before the recent financial crisis, and the latter group were all made after, so the
comparison could easily be tainted by a significant change in risk aversion from one historical period to
another.
190. See supra Section I.B.
191. Chaddus Bruce, Got Cash? You Can Loan Money Like a Big-Time Banker, WIRED, May
9, 2007, http://www.wired.com/techbiz/startups/news/2007/05/microlenders; Christopher Steiner, The
eBay ofLoans, FORBES, Feb. 23, 2007, http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2007/0312/068.html.
192. Lender returns vary greatly from lender to lender. The mean is about 2%, which may
compare favorably with common stocks, at least at present. Compare Prosper.com Lender Return
Distribution, ERIC'S CREDIT COMMUNITY, http://www.ericscc.com/stats/lender-return-distribution (last
visited Feb. 22, 2011), with Tom Lauricella, Investors Hope the 'lOs Beat the '00s, WALL ST. J., Dec.
21, 2009, at Cl (noting that in the decade from 2000-2009, "stocks traded on the New York Stock
Exchange have lost an average of 0.5% a year").
193. Michal Herzenstein et al., The Democratization of Personal Consumer Loans?
Deteriminants of Success in Online Peer-to-Peer Lending Communities, at 32 (Feb. 2008) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.rice.edu/nationalmedia/multimedia/online (noting that there is
"less discrimination and more democratization in P2P lending communities when compared with
institutional lending"); cf Peter Steiner, Cartoon, THE NEW YORKER, July 5, 1993, at 61 ("On the
Internet, nobody knows you're a dog.").
194. Prosper encourages researchers and academics to use its data and share their conclusions
publicly, and several academic papers have been posted on the Prosper website itself. See Academics &
Research, PROSPER, http://www.prosper.com/about/academics.aspx (last visited Mar. 29, 2011) ("One
of our primary objectives in making Prosper market data fully transparent and freely available is to
permit and encourage anyone to study the Prosper market.").
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Ironically, as shall be seen in Part III, the adhesion doctrine-that friend of the
consumer-may threaten Prosper's very existence.
II. Contracts of Adhesion
A. Definition
A "contract of adhesion," in the parlance of contract law, is a take-it-or-
leave-it standard form agreement, usually presented to a consumer by a
business entity.'9 5 Negotiation over any of the terms contained in the form-
except, often, the price-is neither contemplated nor permitted.'96  The
"adherent" is given the mere choice to accept the terms or abandon the
transaction entirely. The terms of an adhesion contract are commonly drafted
by the stronger party to the transaction, but there are instances where the terms
are proffered by a third party and both contracting parties are reduced to the
humble role of adherent.' 97 The bottom line is that a "contract of adhesion"
refers to the combination of two elements: (1) standard form; and (2)
nonnegotiability.19 8
A familiar example of a contract of adhesion is the Google Terms of
Service, which govern the use of Google's websites, such as Google search,
Gmail, or YouTube.' 99 The Terms of Service represent a contract whereby
Google provides services to the user "in consideration for" allowing Google to
195. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 600 (1991); BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 366 (9th ed. 2009) ("A standard-form contract prepared by one party, to be signed by
another party in a weaker position . . . who adheres to the contract with little choice about the terms.").
See generally Rakoff, supra note 34, at 1176 ("The term 'contract of adhesion' has acquired many
significations and therefore needs definition."). For some of the earliest uses of the phrase, see Kessler,
supra note 14; and Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery ofa Life-Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. L. REv. 198,
222 (1919).
196. This Article uses the term "negotiated contract" as an antonym for "contract of
adhesion." It also refers to the weaker party to a contract of adhesion as the "adherent." See, e.g., Daniel
D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REv. 139, 172 (2005); Albert A.
Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict ofLaws, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 1072, 1077 (1953) (using
the term "adherent," perhaps for the first time).
197. E.g., Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 171-72 (Cal. 1981) (discussing an
adhesive "Form B" contract between musical group and concert promoter was drafted and imposed by
musicians' union); Alvin C. Harrell, Basic Choices in the Law of Auto Finance: Contract Versus
Regulation, 7 CHAP. L. REV. 107, 127 (2004) (noting that in the used car market, the standard retail
installment sales contract between a dealer and a consumer "is a standard-form adhesion contract . . . for
the dealer as well as the consumer").
198. Graham, 623 P.2d at 171; Rudbart v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 605 A.2d
681, 686 (N.J. 1992) (citing Rakoff, supra note 34, at 1230); Taylor Bldg. Corp. of Am. v. Benfield, 884
N.E.2d 12, 24 (Ohio 2008); cf Rakoff, supra note 34, at 1177 (offering a list of seven characteristics
that define a "model" contract of adhesion, but clarifying that the seven characteristics are simply the
same two-element definition "[m]ore precisely spelled out").
199. Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE, http://www.google.con/accounts/TOS (last visited
Mar. 29, 2011). For a list of Google's services, see GOOGLE INC., 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 2-7 (2010),
available at http://investor.google.com/financial/2009/filings-archives.html.
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"place . . . advertising on the Services." 2oo And this contract is clearly
nonnegotiable, as it states on its face, "In order to use [any of Google's]
Services, you must first agree to the Terms. You may not use the Services if
you do not accept the Terms." 201 No deviations will be permitted, no
negotiations will be held. Take it or leave it.
From the perspective of contract law, this is problematic. A key normative
premise of the enforcement of contracts is that the legal obligation being
enforced was accepted knowingly and voluntarily (and for consideration);202
hence the law has always refused to enforce contracts tainted by duress, fraud,
or incapacity.203 But contracts of adhesion-which feature unequal bargaining
power and no negotiation-represent the opposite of that paradigmatic
agreement.204 The process of adhesion contracting "is not one of haggle or
cooperative process, but rather of a fly and flypaper,"205 so adherents cannot
206
really be said to have voluntarily assented to the terms of that flypaper. And
without assent, contracts of adhesion are not really "contracts" as traditionally
understood207 and therefore not necessarily subject to the ordinary law of
contracts as it has developed over the ages.208 The fact that a contract is
200. Google Terms of Service, supra note 199, } 17.3; id. 2.3(a) (requiring that users be "of
legal age to form a binding contract with Google"); see Karl T. Muth, Googlestroika: Privatizing
Privacy, 47 DUQ. L. REv. 337, 340 (2009) (noting that "anyone who has ever used Google has assented
to Google's Terms of Service contract"). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1)
(1981) ("[T]he formation of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual
assent to the exchange and a consideration.").
201. Google Terms ofService, supra note 199, 2.1-.2.
202. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 3, 74, 174-177 (1981); 1 FARNSWORTH,
supra note 7, § 3.1; Rakoff, supra note 34, at 1180 (explaining that "contract law is rationalized in large
part on the voluntary assumption of obligation"); W. David Slawson, Mass Contracts: Legal Fraud in
California, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 13 (1974) (noting that "the traditional law of contract characterizes as
a contract only that to which both parties have given their 'assent' because "[i]n a free society no one is
held to duties he has not, in some way, had the opportunity to give or withhold consent").
203. Robert A. Hillman, Debunking Some Myths About Unconscionability: A New Framework
for U.C.C. Section 2-302, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 6 (1981) (noting that these "traditional policing
doctrines" bar enforcement because "a party has not actually and voluntarily agreed to the contract").
204. JOSEPH M. PERSLLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 1.3, at 5 (6th ed. 2009)
("[C]ontracts of 'adhesion' . . . constitute a serious challenge to much of contract theory.").
205. Arthur Alan Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 143 (1970).
206. E.g., Williams v. First Gov't Mortg. & Investors Corp., 225 F.3d 738, 748 (D.C. Cir.
2000) ("[W]hen a party of little bargaining power, and hence little real choice, signs a commercially
unreasonable contract with little or no knowledge of its terms, it is hardly likely that his consent, or even
an objective manifestation of his consent, was ever given to all the terms."); Leff, supra note 205, at
143; Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability's Safety Net Function, 58 ALA. L. REV. 73, 92
(2006) (noting that contracts of adhesion undermine "classical will theory of promise enforcement" as
they lack "true consent"); W. David Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract: The Transformation of
Contracts Law by Standard Forms, 46 U. Pirr. L. REV. 21, 33-35 (1984) (explaining that "lack of assent
is the problem" with adhesion contracts).
207. J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property Rights:
Reconciling Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of Information, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 875, 966
(1999) ("[S]tandard form adhesion contracts . .. are not contracts in the usual sense.").
208. E.g., Rudbart v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 605 A.2d 681, 686 (N.J. 1992)
(noting the "distinct body of law surrounding contracts of adhesion"); Rakoff, supra note 34, at 1174-75
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adhesive is seen as evidence of such a severe imbalance of bargaining power209
as to require some "judicial meddling" with the contract to protect the weaker
party.210
It bears noting that the concept of adhesion pertains only to consumer
contracts, at least as a practical matter. 211 True, the literal definition of a
contract of adhesion-a nonnegotiable standard form agreement-says nothing
about sophistication or bargaining power.212 And, from time to time, a court
will declare a commercial contract between sophisticated parties to be
adhesive. 2 13 After all, Google's Terms of Service constitute a contract of
adhesion for all users, even wealthy and powerful computer experts like Bill
Gates, who is surely a sophisticated party with ample bargaining power. 2 14 But
these are exceptional cases and Holmes is still quite right that "a page of history
is worth a volume of logic."2 15 In theory, the concept of adhesion can be
("[T]he legal system treats contracts of adhesion differently from 'ordinary' contracts," subjecting them
to "a separate body of doctrine.").
209. JLM Indus., Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir. 2004) (explaining that a
contract of adhesion "is a contract formed as a product of a gross inequality of bargaining power
between parties").
210. Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U.
PA. L. REv. 485, 553 (1967). In other words, the legal disfavor for contracts of adhesion stems
ultimately from the assumption that nonnegotiability and unequal bargaining power go hand-in-hand.
But as we shall see in Part III, infra, this is not necessarily so. Rather, parties with perfectly balanced
bargaining power have good reasons for using nonnegotiable standard forms. Consider two sophisticated
traders that consummate a futures contract on a futures exchange. Their bargaining power is
approximately equal. Even so, the parties' agreement is contained in a standard form drafted by the
exchange that the parties are powerless to change. So the fact that a contract is adhesive is not always
conclusive evidence of an inequality of bargaining power.
211. Dudley v. Bass Anglers Sportsman Soc'y, 777 So. 2d 135, 138 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000)
(noting that the common law concept of "contract of adhesion" applies only to "consumer contracts");
Robert S. Alder & Elliot M. Silverstein, When David Meets Goliath: Dealing with Power Diferentials
in Negotiations, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 48 (2000); Rakoff, supra note 34; Todd D. Rakoff, The
Law and Sociology of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REv. 1235, 1235 (2006) (clarifying that the highly
influential views the author famously espoused in Rakoff, supra note 34, "concerned contracts of
adhesion in, roughly speaking, the consumer context"). See generally Meredith R. Miller, Contract Law,
Party Sophistication and the New Formalism, 75 Mo. L. REv. 493, 493-94 (2010) (observing that "case
law and scholarship has fashioned a rigid dichotomy between sophisticated and unsophisticated parties
in a wide array of contract inquiries").
212. 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, § 4.26 n.5.
213. E.g., G-I Holdings, Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 586 F.3d 247, 254 (3d Cir. 2009);
Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1265, 1309 (9th Cir. 2006) (en bane) (finding franchise
agreement involving hundreds of thousands of dollars to be a contract of adhesion); Graham v. Scissor-
Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 171-72 (Cal. 1981) (noting that prominent and successful music promoter
succeeded in showing that he was "reduced to the humble role of 'adherent"'); Rakoff, supra note 34, at
1178, 1253 n.252 (collecting cases).
214. And the usual roles can surely be reversed, as in a parking contract between Bill Gates
and the operator of a small parking garage in Midtown Manhattan. In such a circumstance, Gates,
despite his power and prestige, plays the role of adherent to the garage's standard parking agreement. I
FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, § 4.26 n.5.
215. N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
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applied to anyone, regardless of social or economic rank, but in practice,
216
wealthy or sophisticated parties are almost never treated as adherents.
Moreover, a regular feature of business or employment negotiation is the
use of a standard form contract as a basis for negotiations (a "jumping off
217point"). Many organizations, including the American Bar Association, the
American Institute of Architects, 218 and the International Swap Dealers
Association publish form contracts for this purpose. 2 19 But the resulting
contract in such cases is a product of negotiation and therefore not a contract
of adhesion. In short, the concept of adhesion is, for most practical purposes,
confined to the consumer context; business entities and sophisticated parties
cannot avail themselves of it.
Because much of the concern over contracts of adhesion arises from a
perceived imbalance of bargaining power, some may question whether there
can be a contract of adhesion when the purported adherent has a meaningful
alternative source of the good or service. One could, for example, conduct web
searches on Yahoo! instead of Google. Does that competition in the
marketplace render the Google Terms of Service nonadhesive? Courts and
scholars are split on the issue,221 but the fact is that many courts routinely
declare contracts in obviously competitive industries-such as cell phone
216. E.g., Lanier at McEver, L.P. v. Planners & Eng'rs Collaborative, Inc., 663 S.E.2d 240,
247 (Ga. 2008) (holding that contract between two sophisticated entities on equal footing was not a
contract of adhesion); Torgerson v. One Lincoln Tower, LLC, 210 P.3d 318, 321, 324 (Wash. 2009)
(holding that contract between "trained, licensed real estate agents" and development company to
purchase condominiums was not adhesive). See generally Adler & Silverstein, supra note 211, at 48
("[Plersons of greater sophistication suffer less contractual abuse and need less protection.").
217. E.g., Franci J. Blassberg, Asset Purchase Agreement, in CORPORATE MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS 139 (ALI-ABA Continuing Legal Educ., Coursebook Ser. No. SP031, 2008).
218. E.g., JOSEPH A. DEMKIN, THE ARCHITECT'S HANDBOOK OF PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE
777 (2001) ("[T]he words 'Standard Form' . . . [are] not meant to imply that a uniform set of contractual
requirements is mandatory . . . . Rather, AIA standard documents are intended to be used as fair and
balanced baselines from which the parties can negotiate their bargains.").
219. See Gerald D. Gay & Joanne T. Medero, The Economics of Derivatives Documentation:
Private Contracting as a Substitute for Government Regulation, 3 J. DERIVATIVES 78, 81 (1996)
(explaining that swap contracts are "negotiated between the parties" who may make "modifications
(additions and deletions) to the standard terms" in the International Swaps and Derivatives Association
standard form agreement); Ann Monroe, Dealers Design a Standard Contract for Swaps of Interest
Rates, Currencies, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 1987, at 47 (describing introduction of International Swap
Dealers Association standard contracts for interest rate and currency swaps).
220. See, e.g., Liam Denning, Heard on the Street: Don't Be Negligent About Andarko, WALL
ST. J., June 15, 2010, at CIO (noting that "the standard template for deep-water [oil drilling]
agreements-the American Association of Professional Landmen's Form 810"-is generally modified
to include "specific language" negotiated between the parties).
221. Compare Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 985 (9th Cir.
2007) (holding that a contract may be adhesive "even if the customer has a meaningful choice as to
service providers") (internal quotation marks omitted), and Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d
1257, 1283 (9th Cir. 2006), and Rakoff, supra note 34, at 1178-79, with Clinic Masters v. Dist. Ct., 556
P.2d 473, 475-76 (Colo. 1976), and Wallace v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 938 S.W.2d 684, 687-88
(Tenn. 1996) (a contract is adhesive only if adherent shows that equivalent "services could not be
obtained elsewhere"), and Albuquerque Tire Co., Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 697 P.2d 128,
131 (N.M. 1985).
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service, car rentals, or vacation cruises-to be adhesive, thereby demonstrating
222that market power is not a prerequisite to a finding of adhesion. That said, it
is generally agreed that a contract of adhesion drafted by a monopolist, or
where an entire industry has adopted the same form, is "particularly onerous"
because the adherent has "no alternatives but to enter into the contract." 223
Finally, it is a commonplace that practically no one reads, let alone
understands, the car rental, credit card, cellular telephone, and other contracts
of adhesion to which they assent.224 In part, this is because the agreements are
frequently drafted in "legalese," "fine print," or "boilerplate"-that is, in terms
incomprehensible to the average consumer.225 But this is a red herring, for even
if the language were crystal clear, and even if every adherent read every term, it
227would change nothing.226 An adherent would still be stuck with the mere choice
to adhere or walk away.227 The Google Terms of Service is written in fairly
readable prose,228 so that a user realistically could sit down and read and
understand the terms offered by Google. But what difference would that make?
Any adherent who wants to use Google must accept its terms. The best an
adherent can do is hope that the Terms include only reasonable and decent
terms,229 or that, in the event of a dispute, Google will decline, in the name of
customer relations, to enforce the contract.230
222. E.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991) (holding that cruise
ticket is adhesive); Shroyer, 498 F.3d at 983-84 (holding that cellular telephone service contract is
adhesive); Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 161 P.3d 1000, 1003 (Wash. 2007) (same); see also Phila. Indem.
Ins. Co. v. Barerra, 21 P.3d 395, 402, 404 (Ariz. 2001) (holding that car rental agreement is adhesive).
223. Woodruff v. Bretz, Inc., 218 P.3d 486, 491 (Mont. 2009) (citing Kloss v. Edward D.
Jones & Co., 54 P.3d I (Mont. 2002); and William L. Corbett, Arbitrating Employment Law Disputes,
68 MONT. L. REv. 415,436 (2007)).
224. Hillman, supra note 203, at 13 (1981) ("Consumers generally do not read their forms
and, if they did, they would not understand them."); Rakoff, supra note 34, at 1179; Jean R.
Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1631, 1648 (2005)
("Empirical studies have shown that only a minute percentage of consumers read form agreements, and
of these, only a smaller number understand what they read.").
225. E.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers and Binding Commitments, 75 IND. L.J.
1125, 1153, 1160 (2000); see Joshua Fairfield, The Cost ofConsent: Optimal Standardization in the Law
of Contract, 58 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1406-09 (2009). But see id. at 1431-45 (defending standardized
contracts as reducing transaction costs for all concerned).
226. It would also be absurdly wasteful. See Fairfield, supra note 225.
227. Rakoff, supra note 34, at 1179-80; see, e.g., Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165,
172-73 (Cal. 1981) (finding a contract of adhesion where the sophisticated adherent was very familiar
with the term at issue before signing).
228. See, e.g., Google Terms of Service, supra note 199, $ 1.1 ("Your use of Google's
products, software, services and web sites . . . is subject to the terms of a legal agreement between you
and Google. . . . This document explains how the agreement is made up, and sets out some of the terms
of that agreement.").
229. Cf KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 370 (1960) (explaining that a
party to a contract of adhesion gives its "blanket assent . .. to any not unreasonable or indecent terms the
seller may have on his form").
230. Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of How Standard
Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Businesses and Consumers, 104 MICH. L.
REv. 857, 858 (2006).
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B. Scholarly Critiques
Many, if not most, contracts scholars take a dim view of contracts of
231
adhesion, and the term itself has acquired a strongly negative connotation.
The basic critique is premised on the idea that voluntary assent is a prerequisite
to contractual enforceability-the law has always refused to enforce contracts
tainted by duress, fraud, or incapacity232 -and mere submission to a set of
terms one did not choose and cannot change does not constitute voluntary
233
assent. Hence, many scholars take the view that the lack of voluntary assent
renders contracts of adhesion less entitled than negotiated contracts to legal
enforcement.234
Beyond the problem of lack of assent, scholars have also railed against
contracts of adhesion on other grounds. Todd Rakoff has warned that the use of
adhesion contracts forces consumers to "submi[t] to organizational domination,
leavened by the ability to choose the organization by which [one] will be
dominated."235 And David Slawson has expressed concern that widely used
contracts of adhesion constitute an act of undemocratic lawmaking by powerful
236business interests. In these scholars' view, consumer contracts should be
governed by the default rules of contract law, which are ultimately accountable
to the democratic process, rather than the rules drafted by, and in favor of, the
stronger party.
Contracts of adhesion also have their scholarly defenders. In the mid-
twentieth century, Karl Llewellyn espoused his view that one who signs a
contract of adhesion does "in fact" assent not only to "the few dickered terms,
and the broad type of the transaction," "but one thing more." In Llewellyn's
view, the adherent also gives a "blanket assent" to the "not unreasonable or
231. See IFC Credit Corp. v. Aliano Bros. Gen. Contractors, Inc., 437 F.3d 606, 610 (7th Cir.
2006) (explaining that "contract of adhesion" is a "pejorative" expression); Rory v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 703
N.W.2d 23, 35-36 (Mich. 2005); Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L.
REv. 627, 627 (2002) (noting that the term is "pejorative[]"); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality,
Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1203, 1204 & n.9 (2003) (noting
that "many scholars" object to the enforcement of contracts of adhesion); Leff, supra note 210, at 505
n.68; Peter Linzer, "Implied," "Inferred," and "Imposed": Default Rules and Adhesion Contracts-The
Need for Radical Surgery, 28 PACE L. REV. 195, 208 (2008); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Property Rights
and Competition on the Internet: In Search of an Appropriate Analogy, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 561,
623 (2001) (noting that many scholars object to enforcement of contracts of adhesion); Rakoff, supra
note 34, at 1197-1220; Slawson, supra note 206, at 31-46; W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts
and Democratic Control ofLawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1971). The term began its life as
neutral and descriptive. See Patterson, supra note 195, at 222 (adapting it from the French).
232. Hillman, supra note 203, at 6 (noting that these "traditional policing doctrines" bar
enforcement because "a party has not actually and voluntarily agreed to the contract").
233. Barnett, supra note 231, at 629; Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and
Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 233, 250 (2002) ("[T]he essential issue raised by modem consumer
contracts is one of assent."); cf Slawson, supra note 202, at 47-48 (framing the argument as an "absence
of choice").
234. See sources cited supra note 231.
235. Rakoff, supra note 34, at 1229.
236. Slawson, supra note 231, at 530, 554-55.
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indecent terms the seller may have on his form, which do not alter or eviscerate
the reasonable meaning of the dickered terms."237 In other words,
"unreasonable or indecent" terms should not be enforced by the courts. This
view "dominates contemporary judicial treatment of standard-form
provisions." 23 8
There have been attempts by law and economics scholars, such as Alan
Schwartz, Louis Wilde, and Richard Epstein, to demonstrate that market
competition will lead to terms that are acceptable to, if not fully optimal for,
most adherents.239 Under such conditions, "judicial meddling" in contracts of
adhesion can have the perverse effect of harming the very people it is intended
to assist by, for instance, driving up the cost of consumer credit.240 This
argument from law and economics certainly has force, but critics of adhesion
contracts have struck back with behavioral law and economics. Because
consumers are "boundedly rational rather than fully rational decisionmakers,"
contend the behavioralists, the standard law and economics theory does not
apply to the real world and should therefore be rejected.241
In the end, these dueling law-and-economic analyses have more or less
fought to a tie.242 Richard Posner and others have recently attempted to break
the tie by arguing that businesses concerned with their reputation will, thanks to
customer and public relations concerns, be reluctant to enforce harsh
243
contractual terms to the letter. But the idea that consumers should rely on the
munificence of businesses as protection against legally enforceable harsh terms
provides very little comfort to consumer advocates, for in such cases, "[t]he
discretion of the organization has taken the place of rights enforceable by
law."244 So the mainstream scholarly view remains that contracts of adhesion
237. LLEWELLYN, supra note 229, at 370; see Slawson, supra note 206, at 34.
238. Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard Form Contracting in the Electronic
Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 461 (2002).
239. Richard A. Epstein, Behavioral Economics: Human Errors and Market Corrections, 73
U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 127 (2006); Korobkin, supra note 231, at 1206 ("[]f buyers and sellers behave in
accordance with assumptions of rational choice theory, the operation of the market usually will provide
drafting parties with an incentive to include only efficient terms in form contracts."); Alan Schwartz &
Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic
Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 630, 638 (1979); see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
§ 4.9, at 116 (7th ed. 2007).
240. POSNER, supra note 239, § 4.9, at 117; Leff, supra note 210, at 558-59.
241. Korobkin, supra note 231, at 1206; see Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of
Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 749, 751 (2008) (noting that consumers make systematic
mistakes due to cognitive limitations and businesses "strategically respond" to such mistakes).
242. See David Horton, Flipping the Script: Contra Proferentem and Standard Form
Contracts, 80 U. COLO. L. REv. 431, 469 (2009) ("This debate is not likely to end soon.").
243. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer
Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827, 830 (2006); Johnston, supra note 230, at 858; Rakoff, supra note 34,
at 1228.
244. Rakoff, supra note 34, at 1228.
352
Vol. 28, 2011
Consumer Contract Exchanges
are bad, especially for consumers, and many academics think the law ought not
enforce them. 245
246This academic position, however, has never been adopted as law, for all
agree that contracts of adhesion provide consumers one major benefit that
outweighs the many detriments of such one-sided forms: they greatly reduce
the cost of contracting.247 There are many variations on the theme, but the
essential idea is that just as standardization and mass production can reduce the
248
cost of producing and distributing goods and services, so too can
standardization and mass production reduce the cost of contracting for goods
and services.249 And these savings may be passed along to the weaker party in
the form of a lower price (or interest rate).250
This benefit of standardized contracts of adhesion is both great and widely
appreciated.251 Llewellyn recognized it early on and became a lifelong
252
supporter of the general enforceability of contracts of adhesion. Many other
scholars have followed him, offering careful elaborations on the variety of
ways in which contracts of adhesion reduce transaction costs,253 and many
courts have accepted this line of thinking.254
245. Barnett, supra note 231, at 627 ("1 would wager that a plurality of contracts teachers
would favor a judicial refusal to enforce form contracts altogether."); see sources cited supra note 230.
246. Barnett, supra note 231, at 638-39; Rakoff, supra note 211, at 1235 (acknowledging that
the rule of presumptive unenforceability he proposed in Rakoff, supra note 34, "was not then, and is not
now, the law").
247. Nw. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 1990); Graham v. Scissor-
Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 171 n. 15 (Cal. 1981); Taylor Bldg. Corp. of Am. v. Benfield, 884 N.E.2d 12, 24
(Ohio 2008); 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, § 4.26; POSNER, supra note 239, § 4.9, at 115; Rakoff, supra
note 34, at 1221 ("Standardization is valuable; it reduces transaction costs."); Slawson, supra note 206,
at 24; Karl Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARv. L. REv. 700, 701 (1939) (reviewing 0. PRAUSNITZ, THE
STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL LAW (1937)).
248. ALFREDD. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND 312 (1977).
249. E.g., Wis. Auto Title Loans, Inc. v. Jones, 714 N.W.2d 155, 170 & n.48 (Wis. 2006);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. a (1979); 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, § 4.26
("As with goods, standardization and mass production of contracts may serve the interests of both
parties."); Kaustuv M. Das, Forum-Selection Clauses in Consumer Clickwrap and Browsewrap
Agreements and the "Reasonably Communicated" Test, 77 WASH. L. REv. 481, 485-86 (2002) ("[T]he
advantages of standardization would be lost if customers haggled over or sought legal counsel regarding
standard terms.").
250. Fairfield, supra note 225, at 1409 (2009); Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 238, at 437-
38; David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Terms and Unilateral Amendments, 57 UCLA L. REV.
605, 607 (2010); Kessler, supra note 14, at 632; Alfred W. Meyer, Contracts of Adhesion, 50 VA. L.
REv. 1178, 1179, 1185 (1964); Rakoff, supra note 34, at 1230; Amy J. Schmitz, Legislating in the
Light: Considering Empirical Data in Crafting Arbitration Reforms, 15 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 115,
129, 136 (2010); Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer
Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 89, 89.
251. See sources cited supra note 247.
252. Llewellyn, supra note 247, at 701; see Rakoff, supra note 34, at 1198-1206 (recounting
Llewellyn's works and views). But cf id. at 1201 (suggesting that Llewellyn's view might have been "a
strategic compromise").
253. E.g., Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate
Contracting (or "The Economics ofBoilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997).
254. See sources cited supra note 247.
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Critics of adhesive contracts have persuasively responded, however, that
the transaction-cost savings generated by contracts of adhesion need not be
shared with the consumer. Rather, they can be-and, given the fiduciary duties
that corporate managers owe to shareholders, generally will be-retained by
the business.255 Of course, in competitive markets, some or all of the cost
256
savings will likely be returned to the consumer. In reality, however, many
companies, ranging from Facebook to Con Edison, have monopolistic market
power,25 7 so that transaction-cost analysis has not been enough to impress the
critics of contracts of adhesion,258 many of whom continue to advocate the
presumptive, if not total, unenforceability of contracts of adhesion.259
C. Current Doctrine ,
The costs of adhesion contracts are great, but their efficiency benefits are
so compelling that the courts have never adopted a flat rule against enforcing
them, despite the scholarly support for such a rule.260 Rather, the common law
has adopted an intermediate position: when confronted with a contract of
adhesion, the court must conduct a substantive review of its terms and, if it
finds any such terms (or the agreement as a whole) to be "harsh or overly one-
sided," it has the power to refuse enforcement in whole or part.261
This rule is derived from the equitable unconscionability doctrine, which
holds that while courts must generally enforce any contracts private parties
255. E.g., Fairfield, supra note 225, at 1409 ("Unless there is a reason not to do so, companies
will quite rationally pocket the savings."); Schmitz, supra note 206, at 106 (noting lack of "empirical
proof' that "merchants pass cost of one-sided form contracts on to consumers"); cf Jean R. Sternlight &
Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration To Eliminate Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business
Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 95 (2004) ("[N]o published
studies show that the imposition of mandatory arbitration leads to lower prices.").
256. IFC Credit Corp. v. United Bus. & Indus. Fed. Credit Union, 512 F.3d 989, 993 (7th Cir.
2008) ("As long as the market is competitive, sellers must adopt terms that buyers find acceptable;
onerous terms just lead to lower prices."); Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive
Arbitration Agreements-with Particular Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM.
ARB. 251, 255-56 (2006) (noting that "the entire cost-savings is passed on to consumers only under
conditions of perfect competition," and some savings may pass on even in its absence).
257. This is not necessarily illegal or improper. The markets for branded goods or patented
pharmaceuticals are inherently monopolistic but apparently do not violate the antitrust laws.
258. Contra Jerry A. Hausman & Gregory K. Leonard, Efficiencies from the Consumer
Viewpoint, 7 GEO. MASON L. REv. 707, 721 (1999) (noting that even a monopolist will pass on some of
its cost savings via lower prices).
259. See, e.g., Rakoff, supra note 34, at 1176 (noting that "the form terms present in contracts
of adhesion ought to be considered presumptively (although not absolutely) unenforceable"); Slawson,
supra note 231, at 549-53 (advocating "the total nonenforcement of adhesive contracts" unless "the
power that coerces the adhesive contract is legitimate," that is, democratically derived).
260. See sources cited supra note 246.
261. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991) ("[Florm ... contracts are
subject to judicial scrutiny for fundamental fairness."); Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350
F.2d 445, 449-50 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (explaining that when a contract is adhesive, "the usual rule that the
terms of the agreement are not to be questioned should be abandoned and the court should consider
whether the terms of the contract are so unfair that enforcement should be withheld").
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choose to make, they should refuse to enforce an "unconscionable" contract or
clause.262 Unconscionability is probably an appropriate safety valve to deal
with bargains that shock the conscience, but it is also an "unruly horse" that
could have the effect of injecting a post-hoc judicial review into every
263
contract. To avoid that unfortunate outcome, the common law has
implemented a two-part test requiring a party to establish both "procedural"
and "substantive" unconscionability to succeed on such a claim.26 The
procedural aspect refers to the manner of bargaining and making the contract;
the substantive aspect refers to the bargain actually made. The result is that if a
court finds "bargaining naughtiness" that amounts to procedural
unconscionability, it will abandon the usual rule of freedom of contract and
engage in a substantive review of the terms and bargain as a whole to ensure
that it is fundamentally fair.265
As for contracts of adhesion, most courts view them as ipso facto (if not
per se) procedurally unconscionable.266 This has the important effect of always
subjecting contracts of adhesion to the test for substantive unconscionability,
that is, a substantive review for "fundamental fairness."267
This "clause-by-clause policing" of contracts of adhesion can be expected
to render them less reliably enforceable than negotiated agreements.268 This is
262. 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, § 4.28, at 554.
263. Jeffrey Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of
Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 757, 763 (2004) ("[M]any scholars have suggested that unconscionability is too plastic a concept
that permits too much post-hoc judicial meddling with contracts.").
264. Schmitz, supra note 250, at 75. This bifurcated analysis has its origin in Leff, supra note
210, at 487. A few jurisdictions, namely Arizona and Washington, allow a claim of unconscionability to
be premised on substantive unconscionability alone. See Luna v. Household Fin. Corp. III, 236 F. Supp.
2d 1166, 1174 (W.D. Wash. 2002); Maxwell v. Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 58-60 (Ariz.
1995). And Mississippi appears to allow the same if procedural unconscionability alone is shown. See
Banc One Acceptance Corp. v. Hill, 367 F.3d 426, 433 & n.4 (5th Cir. 2004). But these jurisdictions are
outliers. Strand v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n ND, 693 N.W.2d 918, 921-24 (N.D. 2005) (noting that the
"majority of courts ... have held that a showing of some measure of both procedural and substantive
unconscionability is required"); John E. Murray, Jr., An Effective Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code: Who Is Responsible?, 11 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 123, 127 (2009) (noting that the "conventional wisdom"
requires both).
265. Leff, supra note 210, at 487.
266. See, e.g., Edwards v. HOVENSA, LLC, 497 F.3d 355, 362 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting
Alexander v. Anthony Int'l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 265 (3d Cir. 2003)); Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 279
F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2002); Gentry v. Superior Ct., 165 P.3d 556, 572 (Cal. 2007); Muhammad v.
Cnty. Bank, 912 A.2d 88, 96 (N.J. 2006); D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Green, 96 P.3d 1159, 1162 (Nev. 2004);
Murray, supra note 264, at 127; White & Mansfield, supra note 233, at 263 ("[C]ourts ought to treat the
procedural unconscionability prong as more or less established in any classic consumer contract of
adhesion."). Contra Zuver v. Airtouch Comms., Inc., 103 P.2d 753, 760-61 (Wash. 2004) (holding that
"the fact that an agreement is an adhesion contract does not necessarily render it procedurally
unconscionable" if the alleged adherent "had a meaningful choice to sign the agreement."); Powertel,
Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570, 574 (Fla. App. 1999) (noting that adhesion is "significant" but "not
dispositive" on the issue of procedural unconscionability).
267. E.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 766-68 (Cal.
2000).
268. Leff, supra note 210, at 504, 553.
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because the terms of most negotiated agreements are enforced without any
review at all, while the terms of contracts of adhesion are subject to a
269
substantive review for fairness, and the application of a higher or stricter
standard of review results in more frequent reversals or rejections. In civil
procedure, a lower court ruling is much more likely to be reversed under a de
novo standard than if reviewed for clear error or abuse of discretion;270 in
constitutional law, a statute is much more likely to be invalidated when subject
to strict scrutiny than a rational basis test; and in corporate law, a business
decision is much more likely to lead to liability under an "entire fairness" test
than under "business judgment" review. 2 72 So too in contract law: a clause, or
an entire contract, is much more likely to be refused legal enforcement under a
273fairness review than under no review at all. Hence, imposing a fairness
review on contracts of adhesion should, as a matter of theory, lead courts to
refuse to enforce terms in contracts of adhesion more frequently than in
negotiated agreements, thus rendering contracts of adhesion less reliably
enforceable than their negotiated counterparts.
This theoretical prediction is borne out in practice. Courts regularly refuse
to enforce contracts of adhesion, in whole or part, under the fairness
274
standard. One recent empirical study found that parties claiming a contract of
adhesion to be unconscionable were successful an impressive 43% of the
275 276time. This result may be high, and many victories likely pertain to a single,
perhaps severable, clause.277 But there can be little doubt that the fairness
269. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991).
270. News-Press v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 489 F.3d 1173, 1187 (11th Cir. 2007) ("In
even moderately close, cases, the standard of review may be dispositive of an appellate court's
decision.").
271. See Kahawaiolaa v. Norton, 386 F.3d 1271, 1278 (9th Cir. 2004) ("The conclusion of
whether a governmental act is subject to strict scrutiny or rational basis examination is important, as it
often determines the outcome of the inquiry.").
272. See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 89 (Del. 2001) ("When shareholders
challenge actions by a board of directors, generally one of three standards of judicial review is applied:
the traditional business judgment rule, an intermediate standard of enhanced judicial scrutiny, or the
entire fairness analysis. The applicable standard of judicial review often controls the outcome of the
litigation on the merits.").
273. See generally Klos v. Lotnicze, 133 F.3d 164, 168 (2d Cir. 1997) ("The concept of
adhesion contracts introduces the serpent of uncertainty into the Eden of contract enforcement.").
274. POSNER, supra note 239, § 4.9, at i17; James Boyle, Cruel, Mean, or Lavish? Economic
Analysis, Price Discrimination and Digital Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REv. 2007, 2011 (2000);
Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce L. Rich, A Consent Theory of Unconscionability: An Empirical Study of
Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1067, 1097-98 (2006); Miller, supra note 211, at 500 (noting
"frequent judicial application of unconscionability to temper strict enforcement of adhesion contracts in
the consumer context").
275. DiMatteo & Rich, supra note 274, at 1097-98.
276. The validity of this result may be questioned on the ground that only a few contract of
adhesion cases are ever litigated.
277. Many cases pertain to arbitration clauses. See, e.g., Leonard v. Terminix Int'l Co., 854
So. 2d 529, 539 (Ala. 2002) (holding that the arbitration clause in the adhesive termite inspection
contract was unconscionable); Muhammad v. Cnty. Bank, 912 A.2d 88, 103 (N.J. 2006) (holding that
the provision waiving class-wide arbitration in an adhesive contract was unconscionable, unenforceable,
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review renders contracts of adhesion less reliably enforceable than negotiated
agreements, all else being equal.
In short, thanks to the interplay between adhesive contracts and the
unconscionability doctrine, contracts of adhesion are not reliably enforceable
under current law, especially when the adherent is a consumer. And, as shall be
seen in the final Part, this poses a significant problem for consumer contract
exchanges.
III. Consumer Contract Exchanges and the Problem of Adhesion
The legal treatment of contracts of adhesion presents a paradox for all
contract exchanges. In order to function, a contract exchange requires a legal
system that reliably enforces nonnegotiable standard form contracts.27 Yet
mainstream common law doctrine holds that nonnegotiable standard form
contracts-that is, contracts of adhesion-are subject to a substantive fairness
review and thus not reliably enforceable.279 This presents a fundamental
problem for contract exchanges, one that threatens their very ability to function.
Fortunately, in the context of traditional contract exchanges, like CBOT,
numerous federal appellate and state supreme courts have recognized and
resolved this problem. These courts have held that although contracts traded on
a contract exchange (or secondary) market "unquestionably fit" the "literal
definition" of contracts of adhesion, they must nonetheless be reliably enforced
as if they were ordinary contracts so that the exchange or secondary market can
function.2o Thus, in the context of traditional contract exchanges, the threat
posed by the adhesion doctrine has been neutralized.281
But the threat to consumer contract exchanges remains. The contracts on
Prosper or Hotwire surely look adhesive--consumers that wish to participate
have no choice but to click "I Agree" to the websites' nonnegotiable standard
forms. And the adherents to such contracts are unsophisticated consumers, not
professional traders as in the case of traditional exchanges. Research has not
revealed any case addressing whether consumer contracts that originate on a
contract exchange should be treated as contracts of adhesion and therefore
subject to review for substantive fairness. It is thus unclear whether a court
presented with a contract that originated on a consumer contract exchange
would treat it as a contract of adhesion (and thereby render the exchange
and severable); Fiser v. Dell Computer Corp., 188 P.3d 1215, 1217-22 (N.M. 2008) (holding that the
arbitration clause in adhesive computer purchase contract was unconscionable).
278. See supra Subsection I.A. 1.
279. See supra Section I.C.
280. Rudbart v. N. Jersey Water Supply Comm'n, 605 A.2d 681, 686-89 (N.J. 1992); accord
David L. Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd., 923 F.2d 245, 249 (2d Cir. 1991); Sharon Steel
Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691 F.2d 1039, 1048 (2d Cir. 1982); Broad v. Rockwell Int'l
Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 943 (5th Cir. Apr. 1981) (en banc); Wilborn v. Bank One Corp., 906 N.E.2d 396
(Ohio 2009).
281. See infra Section III.A.
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inoperable), or whether it would extend the case law enforcing traditional
exchange-traded contracts as if they were negotiated agreements to the
consumer context.
This uncertainty in the law has had the negative effect of stunting the
growth of consumer contract exchanges. In each of the consumer-to-business
examples considered in Subsection I.C. 1, the consumer must make full upfront
payment at the time of contracting. This shows that Hotwire and the others
have little confidence that a contract with a consumer can be reliably enforced.
If consumers could be strictly held to their promises, perhaps Hotwire would
allow consumers to pay in installments-say, half of the purchase price at the
time of contracting and half at the time of performance. At least some
consumers would prefer this option and would presumably be willing to pay a
higher overall price. 282
Furthermore, the contracts created and traded on consumer contract
exchanges are quite small and insignificant to the broader economy. For
example, the maximum loan available on Prosper is just $25,000-and the
$200 million in total loans represents less than one-tenth of one percent of the
28$800 billion in total credit card debt held by Americans.28 Why are the loans
on Prosper so small, and why is the market so marginalized? Why does Prosper
not let lenders make loans of $100,000 or more?
One answer is that the adhesion doctrine hangs like the Sword of
Damocles over every Prosper note.284 These are high interest loans to
consumers, many of whom are poor and already highly indebted. Under current
law, a court could easily conclude that the Prosper notes are adhesive to
borrowers and are therefore subject to fairness review. This undermines, to
some extent, the reliable enforceability that is needed for the exchange to
function. This is an acceptable risk to take with small time contracts, but it
would be untenable if "real money" were involved.285
The uncertainty created by the doctrine of adhesion is preventing
consumer contract exchanges from reaching their full potential. Most markets
"scale up" over time to take advantage of economies of scale, but we have not
seen this effect in the consumer contract exchanges that currently exist.
282. Cf Ellen Byron, The Just-in-Time Consumer, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 2010, at Al ("This
summer, Del Monte began reducing the number of canned fruits and vegetables in multi-packs.. . .The
company realized consumers were more worried about overall cost, even if it meant a higher cost per
can. . . . Smaller unit sizes . . . generally mean higher prices-and therefore higher profit margins for
manufacturers.").
283. Mary Pilon, Student-Loan Debt Surpasses Credit Cards, WALL ST. J. BLOGS (Aug. 9,
2010, 1:13 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2010/08/09/student-loan-debt-surpasses-credit-cards/
("Americans owe some $826.5 billion in revolving credit.").
284. It should be noted that the adhesion doctrine does not affect every Hotwire hotel room
because the consumer has already paid upfront, leaving only a business entity to perform.
285. Assume the risk of nonenforcement is 10%. A reasonable person with 90% confidence
that the contracts would be enforced might be willing to contract for a $20 magazine subscription, but
not a $20,000 car.
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Hotwire transactions are usually a few hundred dollars or less, and most
Prosper loans are for a few thousand dollars. At these dollar values, the
transaction costs of litigation are so high that it is not a reasonable alternative.
But at higher values, the threat of litigation could be a realistic one-so long as
the contract is legally enforceable. And yet, higher value consumer contract
exchanges are not observed in the real world, in part because of insecurity over
the enforceability of exchange-traded consumer contracts.
Furthermore, there are a number of consumer contract exchanges that
could theoretically exist, but currently do not, thanks in part to the adhesion
problem. One could have an exchange where cellular telephone companies
compete for consumers' business. Or, consider that early stage funding for
start-up companies often takes the form of credit card debt or loans from close
or distant friends and family of the company's founders, often known as
"angels." 286 Theoretically, a peer-to-peer angel exchange for standardized
business loans for hundreds of thousands, or even millions, of dollars, could be
organized on the Internet.287  This would have the positive effect of
democratizing entrepreneurship by allowing those who lack access to wealthy
investors to have a more equal chance of obtaining sufficient funding for their
fledgling business. 288 Unfortunately, no such exchange exists at present.
One reason for the lack of these hypothetical exchanges is the uncertain
enforceability of the contracts that would be created. This is not, of course, the
only thing standing in their way. Other hurdles exist, such as a potential need
for regulatory approval or industry cooperation. A secondary market in airline
tickets, for instance, appears to be impossible, since even if Hotwire were to
allow it, an industry-wide ban on the practice would still be in place. 289 But the
point is this: even were the other obstacles overcome, the adhesion problem
would remain. Consider Prosper: the promissory notes and marketplace (that is,
286. See Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior ofAngel Investors, 61 VAND. L.
REv. 1405, 1406 (2008) ("[T]he prototypical angel" is "rich old Uncle Joe, the wealthy, distant relative
or family acquaintance.").
287. See generally Darian M. Ibrahim, Debt as Venture Capital, 2010 ILL. L. REv. 1170, 1178
("[A] typical venture loan is anywhere from $2-10 million."). Some very small angel-type loans are
presently made on Prosper. See, e.g., About, 6TH MEGA, http://6thmega.com/about (last visited Feb. 22,
2011) (explaining that 6th Mega, a software development company, was "established and fully funded
by peer-to-peer lending on the Prosper.com platform").
288. See Andrew A. Schwartz, Old Enough To Fight, Old Enough To Swipe: A Critique of the
Infancy Rule in the Federal Credit CARD Act, 2011 UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (on file with
author).
289. See Ticketing-Name Change Restrictions, AM. AIRLINES,
http://www.aa.com/il8n/agency/BookingTicketing/Ticketing/NameChangeRestrictionsjsp (last
visited Mar. 29, 2011) ("Most airlines have automation in place which will automatically cancel a
booking if the name field is altered."). Delta Airlines, however, has recently instituted something akin to
a contract exchange for its tickets by asking passengers, at the time of booking, to "name their price" for
being "bumped" from their flight to a later one. See Mike Esterl, Delta Makes Fliers Bid To Get
Bumped, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 2011, at BI. Ifa flight is overbooked, Delta bumps those passengers that
chose the lowest value and pays them their requested sum. See id. All parties can be expected to benefit
from this new system: passengers will only be bumped at a price they deem fair; Delta will reduce the
amount it has to pay to bumped passengers; and all will save time. See id.
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secondary market) are regulated by the SEC, so there is no regulatory
uncertainty. The business risk is all on the lenders, not Prosper itself And yet,
Prosper still has a maximum loan size of just $25,000.290
The remainder of this Part proceeds as follows: Section II.A describes the
case law holding that although traditional exchange-traded contracts are by
their nature adhesive, they should be strictly enforced so that the exchange (or
secondary market) can function. Then, Section III.B analyzes the extent to
which the case law pertaining to traditional contract exchanges can be extended
291
and applied to the context of the consumer contract exchange.
A. Traditional Contract Exchanges
When it comes to futures and other traditional exchange-traded contracts,
the law is settled regarding adhesion. Numerous courts have observed that such
contract exchanges are in the public interest and have recognized that their
operation depends on the reliable enforceability of the standard form contracts
used. They have, accordingly, held that although such contracts meet the literal
definition of contracts of adhesion, they should be treated as if they were
ordinary, negotiated agreements-that is, they should be not reviewed for
292fairness but rather be strictly enforced. Leading scholars, including some of
the greatest critics of adhesion contracts, concur that the standard form
contracts used on traditional contract exchanges, like CBOT, should not be
subject to the special rules for adhesion contracts.293
The conclusion that traditional exchange-traded contracts should not be
treated as adhesive has been based on three basic arguments. First, courts have
relied on the idea that anyone who trades on a traditional contract exchange is a
sophisticated party to whom the concept of adhesion has no application.294 The
290. It is also possible that the existing consumer contract exchanges satisfy the existing
demand. But given how many Americans are interested in starting their own businesses, and how
difficult it is to raise financing for such endeavors, see Schwartz, supra note 288, at 44, it seems likely
that there is unmet demand for startup business capital.
291. The present discussion is focused on a common law solution, but legislative or regulatory
solutions may also be possible. See, e.g., John J.A. Burke, Contract as Commodity: A Nonfiction
Approach, 24 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 285, 310-25 (2000) (describing a "Standard Form Contract Act"
proposed (but never enacted) by the New Jersey Law Revision Commission).
292. E.g., Rudbart v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 605 A.2d 681, 686 (N.J. 1992);
Wilborn v. Bank One Corp., 906 N.E.2d 396 (Ohio 2009). This is so even though most traditional
contract exchanges really do hold a monopoly on a given contract, so traders cannot take their business
elsewhere. KoLBI & OVERDAHL, supra note 5, at 53 ("We rarely see multiple exchanges offering similar
contracts and competing head-to-head. Trading volume tends to migrate to one exchange and stay
there."); id. ("Once a market is established at a particular exchange, the cost of switching from the
established, liquid market to a new, illiquid market can be prohibitively high. There are only a few
instances in futures market history where an established contract has been pulled away to be hosted by a
competing exchange.").
293. Rakoff, supra note 34, at 1178 n.13 (excluding "exchange rules" from his definition of
contract of adhesion); Slawson, supra note 202, at 48-49.
294. E.g., Met. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1505, 1521 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (holding that a corporate party that is "among the country's most sophisticated financial
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Second Circuit, for instance, rejected a claim that a futures contract traded on
the London Metal Exchange was a contract of adhesion on the grounds that the
supposed adherent was no rube, but rather a "sophisticated commodities trader
with extensive experience in this field." 2 95
Second, courts have held that regulated contracts should not be treated as
adhesive because free-ranging judicial review for fairness of regulated
296
contracts would be inappropriate in light of the regulatory scheme. Pursuant
to the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act, for example, investors
must be "given all materials necessary to make an informed decision" when
investing in securities. In passing those statutes, Congress specifically rejected
a substantive "governmental review" of the "risk, fairness, good sense, or other
substantive qualities of the offered security."297 In light of that legislative
judgment, it would be inappropriate for a court to treat an investment contract
governed by the SEC as a contract of adhesion and review it for fundamental
fairness.298
In a similar vein, the "conforming" residential mortgages that have been
traded in a secondary market since the early 1970s are on standard forms, as
they must be. These forms were drafted in an elaborate public process that
incorporated suggestions from lenders, consumer advocates (including Ralph
Nader), legislators, and others.299 For this reason, although such mortgages
"may well resemble contracts of adhesion," courts have recognized that they
should not be treated as such. 300
Third, and most importantly, courts have relied on the public policy
importance of contract exchanges to flatly override the usual rules that pertain
to contracts of adhesion .301 They have recognized that the liquidity and other
benefits of fungible contracts are so valuable that any concerns over the
adhesive nature of such contracts must be set aside.302 The 1992 New Jersey
institutions" and "entered [a] liquid trading market with [its] eyes wide open" was barred from invoking
the doctrine of adhesion); Rudbart, 605 A.2d at 687; Miller, supra note 211, at 513; see supra Section
I.A.
295. David L. Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd., 923 F.2d 245, 249 (2d Cir. 1991).
296. E.g., Rudbart, 605 A.2d at 688.
297. Id. at 689.
298. Id. ("[J]udicial review of the fairness of negotiable securities would be inconsistent with
federal and state securities laws.").
299. Wilbom v. Bank One Corp., 906 N.E.2d 396, 403 (Ohio 2009).
300. Id.
301. E.g., Rudbart, 605 A.2d at 688; Wilborn, 906 N.E.2d 396; Rakoff, supra note 34, at 1178
n.13; Slawson, supra note 202, at 48-89; see also Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.,
691 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1982) (citing Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 943 (5th Cir. Apr.
1981) (en banc)).
302. Wilborn, 906 N.E.2d at 407 ("[P]ublic policy strongly favors" the strict enforcement of
"uniform mortgage forms" to "permit the trading of Ohio's conventional mortgages on the secondary
market.").
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Supreme Court case of Rudbart v. North Jersey District Water Supply
Commission provides an example of this type of case. 30 3
In Rudbart, a public water utility issued $75 million in promissory notes
to the public-a standard tax-exempt government bond offering. Sometime
later, the utility sought to redeem the notes early and published notice to that
effect, as it was permitted to do under the terms of the notes.3* Some of the
noteholders apparently did not see the notices and failed to redeem, leaving
them with an unattractive cash-out price. 305 They sued the utility, claiming that
the notes constituted a contract of adhesion with an unfair term, namely the
publication notice provision. The trial court summarily dismissed this
argument. 3 06 But the appellate court reversed, holding that "a note or other
security sold to the general investing public pursuant to standard form
contractual provisions is a contract of adhesion" and therefore subject to a
307
substantive judicial review for fairness. The ruling created an uproar and was
appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court.3 08
The New Jersey Attorney General, who joined the suit at that point as
amicus curiae, explained that the "transfer of securities in the primary and
secondary market hinges upon the certainty of the terms of [those] securities,
and the assurance that those terms cannot be overridden by judicial fiat.",309 The
appellate court's ruling, by calling that assurance into question, threatened to
"wreak havoc in the securities markets," according to contemporaneous news
accounts.310 In other words, by treating the notes as contracts of adhesion, the
appellate panel undermined the reliable enforceability that is necessary to the
functioning of the secondary market.311
The New Jersey Supreme Court understood that the appellate court's
ruling threatened to destroy the secondary market for New Jersey government
bonds, and perhaps many other contracts.312 As such, it pragmatically held that
303. Rudbart, 605 A.2d at 687. Rudbart concerned the government bond market, which did
not take place on a contract exchange, but its reasoning applies with at least as much force to a contract
exchange.
304. Id. at 683-84.
305. Id. at 684.
306. Rudbart v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 568 A.2d 1213, 1215 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1990).
307. Id. at 1216-17 (finding that the publication notice provision was "unfair" and thus
unenforceable).
308. See Lynn Stevens, Appeal Weighed of NJ. Ruling That Could Disrupt Markets, BOND
BUYER, Jan. 4, 1991, at I ("This is the first time that a court has held that the doctrine of a contract of
adhesion can be applied to a security. If the Supreme Court of New Jersey doesn't do something to
reverse the ruling, or to clarify it or put it on a different footing, it will unsettle the capital markets."
(quoting Peter N. Perretti, Jr., an attorney representing the American Bankers Association)).
309. Rudbart, 605 A.2d at 682-83.
310. Stevens, supra note 308.
311. See supra Subsection l.A. I.b.
312. Rudbart, 605 A.2d at 686-88; id. at 682 ("The decision [below] has the potential of
opening to scrutiny by the courts the terms and conditions of notes and securities that have been sold to
the public by governmental agencies throughout the State.").
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the doctrine of adhesion should be ignored in this instance due to the public
policy importance of functioning contract exchanges:
The project notes involved here unquestionably fit our definition of contracts
of adhesion. That is, they were presented to the public on standardized printed
forms, on a take-it-or-leave-it basis without opportunity for purchasers to
negotiate any of the terms....
[But strict] enforcement of their terms advances rather than contravenes
well-established and important public policies [in support of the] freedom of
transferability which is essential to the negotiability of investment securities.
Subjecting the terms of [the notes] to continual judicial determinations of
fairness would seriously impair the reliability and transferability of such
instruments....
We therefore conclude that although the project notes fit our literal definition
of contracts of adhesion, plaintiffs are bound by [their terms] because of [these]
unique policy considerations .... 313
Thus, thanks to cases like Rudbart, traditional contract exchanges are safe
from the threat of the doctrine of adhesion. The same cannot be said for
consumer contract exchanges, however.
B. Consumer Contract Exchanges
Courts have used three theories to shield traditional contract exchanges
from the doctrine of adhesion: sophistication, regulation, and public policy.314
Can any of these three arguments be used to protect contracts traded on
consumer contract exchanges from the concept of adhesion?
As for the first argument, regarding trader sophistication, one can plainly
see that this rationale is by definition unavailable in the consumer context. 3 15
And as for the second argument, it can be applied to a regulated exchange like
Prosper, which operates under the watchful eye of the SEC, but that is an
exceptional case. Much more commonly, consumer contracts and consumer
contract exchanges are not directly regulated.
This leaves only the third argument-public policy-as a reason to
reliably enforce the contracts of adhesion created or traded on consumer
contract exchanges. As we have seen, consumer contract exchanges are highly
beneficial to consumers, both in theory and in practice. Hotwire and
Priceline provide consumers with the lowest prices available, and Prosper
313. Id. at 687-89 (emphasis added).
314. See supra Section I.A.
315. See Miller, supra note 211, at 493.
316. See supra Sections I.B-.C.
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offers attractive loan terms to consumers. This is all beneficial to consumers
and in the public interest.
Recall that the underlying assumption of the adhesion doctrine is that a
consumer that agrees to a nonnegotiable standard form contract must have been
at a severe bargaining disadvantage compared to their counterparty." But in
the case of a consumer contract formed or traded on an exchange, the link
between nonnegotiability and unequal bargaining power is broken. Rather than
allowing consumers to be dominated, contracts of adhesion created or traded on
consumer contract exchanges have precisely the opposite effect-they amplify
consumers' bargaining power.
Thus, consumers that participate in consumer contract exchanges have
roughly equal, if not more, bargaining power than their counterparties, as can
be seen by the attractive rates and prices obtained. In other words, the policy
concern over contracts of adhesion is not really present in a consumer contract
created or traded on an exchange, as the competition of the exchange
substitutes for bargaining over terms. The surprising result is that the policy of
the adhesion doctrine-to protect consumers-is best achieved by ignoring the
doctrine in the context of consumer contract exchanges.
This is not to say that the contracts created or traded on consumer contract
exchanges are not adhesive; clearly they are. However, just as they have
already done in the context of traditional contract exchanges, 3 courts should
candidly recognize that while exchange-traded consumer contracts are
adhesive, they are also extremely beneficial to their adherents. Indeed, they are
so beneficial that public policy demands such contracts be reliably enforced.
Any other conclusion would have the terrible effect of denying consumers
access to contract exchanges and all of their attendant benefits.319 In short, the
doctrine of adhesion should not be applied to exchange-traded consumer
contracts.320
Assume that this recommendation is adopted as law. What about the
possibility that bad actors could exploit the protection from fairness review to
impose harsh terms on consumers? After all, consumers are not sophisticated
traders able to protect themselves and, as yet, there is no protective regulation
of these exchanges. For example, a group of payday lenders could establish a
contract exchange and lawfully impose terms on its customers that would never
pass muster today.
317. See supra Part II.
318. See supra Section II.A.
319. See Leff, supra note 210, at 557 ("[T]he benevolent have a tendency to colonize, whether
geographically or legally.").
320. This Article does not call for the abolition of the special legal regime surrounding
contracts of adhesion, see supra Section IIC, but merely for an exception to be made when a contract of
adhesion is traded on an organized exchange.
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There are at least two responses to this worst-case scenario: market
competition and future regulation.321 Competition should have the effect of
driving bad actors out of the market. In the payday lending scenario, a rival
lending exchange that offers better terms to its customers can be expected to
garner more customers and attract customers away from the predatory lender.
Consumers are not sophisticated in the sense of futures traders, but they can be
expected to compare prices and choose the most advantageous offer, especially
on the Internet, where comparisons are immediate. In addition, expert
information intermediaries, such as Consumer Reports, can examine terms and
provide consumers with a simple score, rating, or review of contractual
terms.322 This bare minimum of competitive pressure should limit the size and
impact of bad actors.
There may also be a role here for regulation in the future,323 in particular
because many traditional contract exchanges tend toward monopoly.324 Butter
contracts are traded on one exchange, wheat contracts on another, and gold
325
contracts on a third. This is because the more liquid a market, the better;
once a dominant market player establishes itself for a given contract, all traders
will flock there.326 But things may be different in the context of online
consumer contract exchanges. Witness that Prosper and its primary rival,
327Lending Club, both have almost exactly the same amount of loans funded.
Were one to include a harsh term in their standard form loan agreement, word
would surely spread among these Internet-savvy consumers, and they would
trend toward the other. 328
Whether, and what type of, regulation will ultimately prove necessary is a
question for another day when consumer contract exchanges have flowered into
321. In addition, an action for rescission based on fraud would be available.
322. This is already happening in other spheres, such as the online social network Facebook.
See, e.g., Brad Stone and Brian Stelter, Facebook Backtracks on Use Terms, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2009,
at BI (reporting that a blog run by Consumer Union, publisher of Consumer Reports, flagged a change
to Facebook's Terms of Service giving Facebook rights to users' pictures, videos, blog posts, and
messages, even after users left Facebook, which "set off an explosion of activity that overwhelmed
Facebook[]," including threatened litigation).
323. Prosper is already subject to SEC regulation. See Press Release, Prosper Marketplace
Inc., Prosper's SEC Registration Declared Effective (July 13, 2009), available at
http://www.prosper.com/about/media press-releases.aspx?t-Prosper'sLSECRegistration-Declared
Effective.
324. See sources cited supra note 292.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Compare About Us, LENDINGCLUB, http://www.lendingclub.com/public/about-us.action
(last visited Jan. 22, 2011) (approximately $212 million), with Company Overview, supra note 178
(approximately $216 million).
328. But what about really onerous and offensive terms? Without the adhesion doctrine, will a
court be forced to enforce that term against an unwilling borrower? Another contract doctrine, one that
applies to all contracts, whether adhesive or negotiated, will come into play in such circumstances. That
doctrine holds that contracts or terms that are contrary to "public policy" will not be enforced. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981). Hence, illegal contracts, such as for murder, are
not enforceable. There is no need to resort to adhesion doctrine to come to this conclusion.
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their full potential. But that cannot happen until the present uncertainty over the
reliable enforceability of exchange-traded consumer contracts is lifted. The
courts should therefore resolve this issue and hold that exchange-traded
consumer contracts should not be treated as contracts of adhesion but rather
should be reliably enforced as if they were ordinary, negotiated contracts.
Conclusion
This Article has argued that the common law should adjust, as it always
has, to new and changed circumstances. The common law surrounding
contracts of adhesion was developed as a means to protect consumers. But in
the case of consumer contract exchanges, application of that doctrine would
have precisely the opposite effect. The courts should therefore clarify that
contracts created or traded on consumer contract exchanges will be enforced as
if they were ordinary, negotiated agreements, despite the fact that they fit the
literal definition of contracts of adhesion.
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